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ABSTRACT

Studies of Financial Analysts: Over-optimism, Investment Value and Herding Behavior
Tao Li
Chair of the Supervisory Committee:
Professor of Statistics, Sam Woolford
Department of Mathematical Sciences

Financial research analysts are experts who analyze the financial markets and company
fundamentals to make investment recommendations. Based on the US analysts’ stock
recommendations, I examine the issue of financial analysts’ over-optimism, the
investment value of analysts’ stock recommendations, and analysts’ leader-follower
herding behavior. The goal of this thesis is to enhance the understanding of the roles that
financial analysts play in promoting information transmission in the financial market.

The study of analysts’ over-optimism focuses on the market reaction asymmetry.
Consistent with analysts being over-optimistic, the financial market responds more
strongly to analysts’ unfavorable recommendations than to their corresponding favorable
recommendations. This market reaction asymmetry reflects how investors perceive
analysts’ over-optimism and discount the potential bias. The study measures the effect of
regulatory efforts to reduce the market reaction asymmetry through the adoption of
NASD Rule 2711, NYSE Rule 472 and the Global Analyst Research Settlement.
However, after considering the “Self-Correction” mechanism of the financial market, the
analysis indicates that the actual over-optimism mitigation due to the regulatory
intervention was only a 0.7% reduction in the market reaction asymmetry.
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The study of the investment value of analysts’ recommendations is performed through a
portfolio construction approach. I use both a passive asset allocation strategy and an
active asset allocation strategy to create recommendation-based portfolios. The passive
strategy utilizes a market-value weighting to rebalance the portfolio and the active
strategy uses a Black-Litterman model to determine the optimal stock weight in
rebalancing. I find that both strategies generate positive abnormal returns. The active
asset allocation strategy outperforms the passive strategy as it allows investors to gain
incremental values by overweighting outperforming industries and underweighting
underperforming industries.

In studying analysts’ herding behavior, herding behavior is defined as issuing leaderfollower recommendations in the presence of clustered recommendations. Based on a
network analysis approach, I find that analysts’ herding network structure and analysts’
centrality can explain their performance on non-herding recommendations. This finding
is consistent with a learning by herding hypothesis, which states that analysts can acquire
knowledge from other analysts when learning is the motivation to herd.
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION
Financial analysts play an important role in the financial market as they are
believed to be experts who can provide insights toward stock performance and facilitate
the distribution of information to various market participants. Understanding the
performance of analysts’ stock recommendations has been one of the major research
topics in the related literature. In my dissertation thesis, I examine the value of analysts’
recommendations in four different studies, which cover the topics in analysts’ overoptimism, regulations on analysts’ research, investment strategy based on analysts’
recommendations, and analysts’ herding behaviors.
In my first study, I take an economic perspective to assess analysts’ overoptimism in their recommendations. Different from existing literature that analyzes
analysts’ over-optimism from the skewness toward favorable recommendations in the
rating distribution (B. M. Barber, Lehavy, & Trueman, 2010; C.-Y. Chen & Chen, 2013;
Francis & Soffer, 1997; Kadan, Madureira, Wang, & Zach, 2009; McNichols & O'Brien,
1997), my study aims to capture the economic implication for the over-optimism and I
focus on the asymmetric market reactions to the favorable and unfavorable
recommendations. The market reactions to analysts’ recommendations reflect how
investors discount the potential over-optimistic bias. Through an event analysis, I find
that analysts’ favorable recommendations consistently underperform their corresponding
unfavorable recommendations, regardless whether the comparison is based on
recommendation ratings or recommendation revisions. Using the measurement of overoptimism by this market reaction asymmetry, I demonstrate that the level of analysts’
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over-optimism varies across their experience, the level of rating change in the revision,
and the level of uncertainty in the financial market.
The issue of analysts’ over-optimism was initially brought into attention when
academics and policymakers were aware of the conflicts of interest faced by analysts
with investment banking affiliations. The concern of conflicts-of-interest culminated in
the adoption of several rules to regulate analysts’ research. NASD Rule 27111, NYSE
Rule 4722, and the Global Analyst Research Settlement3 are a series of enforcement
actions to address the issue of conflicts-of-interest. My second study examines how these
regulatory efforts affect the market reaction asymmetries. Existing literature suggests that
conflict-of-interest is only one possible explanation for analysts’ over-optimism. Analysts
can also be truly over-optimistic because of their behavioral bias in processing
information (Easterwood & Nutt, 1999; Francis & Soffer, 1997). The major research
motivation in this study is to evaluate the policy effect, in which the mitigation of overoptimism due to the regulation is separated from that due to other factors related to
behavioral bias. Utilizing a structural break detection method and a difference-indifferences analysis, I demonstrate that the financial market possesses a “SelfCorrection” mechanism which alleviates analysts’ over-optimism even without the
regulatory intervention. Failure to account for this “Self-Correction” mechanism leads to
an over-estimation of the policy effect.

1

See http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3675

2

See http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6945

3

See https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm
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In my third study, I take a practical perspective to study the investment value of
analysts’ recommendations. Motivated by the desire to explore the incremental
investment value in analysts’ recommendations, my study compares the profitability of
following analysts’ recommendations under different trading strategies. Different from
the passive portfolio construction approach that is widely adopted by researchers in the
literature (B. Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, & Trueman, 2001; B. M. Barber, Lehavy,
McNichols, & Trueman, 2006; Hobbs, Kovacs, & Sharma, 2012; Jegadeesh & Kim,
2006), my study includes an active portfolio construction approach in which investors
can overweight/underweight their asset allocation according to the content of analysts’
recommendations. I build the active portfolio based on the Black-Litterman framework
(G. He & Litterman, 1999; Idzorek, 2002; Walters, 2014) and I demonstrate that the
Black-Litterman portfolio can achieve a higher abnormal return than the passive portfolio
by overweighting (underweighting) of financial sectors that are outperforming
(underperforming).
In my last study, I take a socioeconomic perspective to study analysts’ herding
behavior and analyze how herding can affect the performance of their recommendations.
Differing from the existing studies that view herding as detrimental to the financial
market (Durand, Limkriangkrai, & Fung, 2014; Hong, Kubik, & Solomon, 2000;
Trueman, 1994; Welch, 2000), I propose a learning by herding hypothesis that
emphasizes the benefit of herding. In this study, I identify analysts’ herding by their
leader-follower behavior when there is clustering of recommendations on the same stock
and use network analysis to study the information flow and knowledge transfer in the
herding network. I demonstrate that analysts can acquire knowledge and gain skills from
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the practice of learning by herding and the success of learning depends on both the
structure of the herding network and analyst’s role in the network.
My dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents my first study, which
examines analysts’ over-optimism and the statistical properties regarding the market
reaction asymmetry. In Chapter 3, I present my second study which examines the
mitigation of the over-optimism. Chapter 4 presents my third study, which discusses the
recommendation-based trading strategies and explores the investment value of analysts’
recommendations. In Chapter 5, I present my fourth study which analyzes analysts’
herding networks and tests the learning by herding hypothesis. Lastly, Chapter 6
summarizes my dissertation thesis, discusses the limitations and outlines the future
research plans.
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CHAPTER 2 : ANALYST’S OVER-OPTIMISM AND MARKET REACTION
ASYMMETRY
Despite the ample evidence supporting that analysts’ stock recommendations are
informative (B. Barber et al., 2001; B. M. Barber et al., 2010; Berkman & Yang, 2016;
Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, & Lee, 2004; Jegadeesh & Kim, 2006; Womack, 1996),
researchers also document findings regarding the issue of over-optimism that results in
potential bias in analysts’ recommendations (Clarke, Khorana, Patel, & Rau, 2011;
Easterwood & Nutt, 1999; K. Li, Lockwood, Lockwood, & Uddin, 2015; W.-C. Lin,
Chang, Chen, & Liao, 2013; Rajan & Servaes, 1997). The concern of analysts’ overoptimistic bias was initially raised during the 2000 financial crisis, which is also known
as the Dot.com bubble (Galbraith & Hale, 2003). Prior to the burst of the bubble, many
stocks had been touted by the financial analysts as good investment opportunities.
However, investors who followed those analysts’ recommendations suffered significant
losses during the crisis. Since then, both academics and regulators increased the concern
of analysts’ over-optimism and began investigation on this issue.
Most existing literature related to analysts’ over-optimism focused on the
tendency that analysts liked to issue favorable recommendations and avoided unfavorable
recommendations, which resulted in an asymmetric distribution for the recommendation
ratings (B. M. Barber et al., 2006; Chan, Lo, & Su, 2014; C.-Y. Chen & Chen, 2013). In
this chapter, I join the discussion of the analysts’ over-optimism and use the actual
measurement of the asymmetric performance to examine analysts’ over-optimism. I find
that analysts’ favorable recommendations consistently yield weaker market reactions
when compared to their unfavorable recommendations. This market reaction asymmetry
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provides valuable insights into analysts’ over-optimism as it centers on the economic
value of the recommendations, which is overlooked by most prior studies. In this chapter,
I provide a detailed study of the statistical properties of the market reaction asymmetry.
Then, I explore the factors that account for the market reaction asymmetries, providing
additional insight into analysts’ over-optimism.
In the study of the effectiveness of analysts’ recommendations, researchers have
already found that the magnitude of the abnormal returns associated with “Strong Buy”
and “Buy” recommendations generally underperforms that associated with “Strong Sell”
and “Sell” recommendations (B. Barber et al., 2001; B. M. Barber et al., 2006). I extend
this assessment of the performance asymmetry and provide further findings related to the
consistency of the market reaction asymmetry. Through an event analysis approach, I
examine both the price reaction and trading volume reaction to the announcement of the
analysts’ recommendations. I demonstrate that the market reaction asymmetry is
consistent across i) recommendation ratings, and ii) recommendation revisions. To be
specific, based on recommendation ratings, I find the market reaction to the “Strong
Buy/Buy” recommendation is consistently weaker than those to the corresponding
“Strong Sell/Sell” recommendations. Based on the revision actions, I find that the
financial market consistently exhibits a weaker response to upgrade revisions than to a
corresponding downgrade revision.
This chapter makes the following contributions to the literature regarding
analysts’ over-optimism. First, my study proposes a new way to measure analysts’ overoptimism, which focuses on the consequent impairment of the economic value in the
recommendations rather than the antecedent incentive to issue overly-optimistic
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recommendations. This measure exhibits consistent statistical significance regardless of
how we define which recommendations are “favorable/unfavorable” in determining the
asymmetry. Second, I provide a profiling of the over-optimism across analysts’
experience, stock coverage, level of recommendation revision, and financial economic
situations. My result shows that analysts with mid-range tenure have more over-optimism
than inexperienced analysts and established analysts; that recommendations on wellfollowed stocks contain less over-optimism; that recommendation revisions with a minor
level of rating change contain more over-optimism than revisions with a large level of
rating change; and that analysts have a higher level of over-optimism when the financial
market is more turbulent.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 reviews literature related to
analysts’ over-optimism. Section 2.2 presents the data and descriptive analysis. Section
2.3 discusses the specifications for the event analysis. Section 2.4 presents results and
explores the consistency of the market reaction asymmetry. Section 2.5 concludes the
chapter.

2.1 Literature Review
It has been well documented that there is information asymmetry between the
market participants and the management of the associated firms (Batabyal, 2012).
Therefore, one of the financial analysts’ roles is to provide extra information that reduces
the information asymmetry. According to the market efficient hypothesis (Fama, 1998;
Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993), analysts’ recommendations reflect private information that
can be translated into abnormal performance for the recommended stocks. Existing
literature generally concludes that analysts’ recommendations are associated with
7

significant market reactions (B. Barber et al., 2001; B. M. Barber et al., 2010; R. Brown,
Chan, & Ho, 2009; Jegadeesh & Kim, 2006) and the influential capacity of analysts’
recommendations is determined by the characteristics of individual analysts, the
characteristics of the underlying stocks, and the characteristics of the market situations
(Booth, Chang, & Zhou, 2014; R. Brown et al., 2009; Casey, 2013; Grant, Jarnecic, &
Su, 2015; Groysberg, Healy, Serafeim, & Shanthikumar, 2013; Jegadeesh et al., 2004;
Jegadeesh & Kim, 2006; Loh & Stulz, 2011; Mikhail, Walther, & Willis, 2007; Murg,
Pachler, & Zeitlberger, 2014).
If analysts produce information that is free of bias, then their Buy
recommendations and Sell recommendations should generate equally significant market
responses. However, due to the over-optimism bias, analysts’ recommendations are
generally biased and associated with various asymmetries. Existing studies have
employed different methods to measure the asymmetries in order to document the
evidence of analysts’ over-optimism. One major measure for analysts’ over-optimism is
the distribution asymmetry, where buy recommendations are more prevalent than sell
recommendations in the financial market (B. M. Barber et al., 2006; C.-Y. Chen & Chen,
2013; Jegadeesh & Kim, 2006). Analysts are more likely to issue favorable
recommendations than unfavorable recommendations, which results in this asymmetric
distribution of the recommendations. Some researchers focus on the incentive to be
optimistic and measure analysts’ over-optimism by the likelihood to issue favorable
recommendations. For example, Clarke et al. (2011) applied a logit model to examine
whether analysts’ incentive to issue “Strong Buy” ratings was related to analysts’
experience, brokerage firm size, or stock momentum. Chan et al. (2014) focused on
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analysts’ likelihood to downgrade or to drop coverage and they found that analysts were
more likely to revise to hold rather than revise to sell. DONG and HU (2016) used the
probability score for sell ratings to represent analysts’ over-optimism and they showed
that weekend recommendations are associated with a lower level of optimism. Bernhardt,
Wan, and Xiao (2016) proposed an ordered probit model with a component friction to
examine the recommendation revisions, and they found that analysts have more friction
to downgrade from a favorable rating than to make the corresponding upgrade from an
unfavorable rating.
If investors can discern the issue of over-optimism and they discount the potential
bias, the over-optimism can also be reflected by the market reaction asymmetry between
the favorable recommendations and unfavorable recommendations. Womack (1996)
found that stock prices continue to reflect the downward trend for the sell
recommendation for up to six months while the influence of the buy recommendations
only lasts for one month. Chan et al. (2014) found that the stock market is less responsive
to upgrades issued by analysts who are known to be overly optimistic and favorable
recommendations generally underperform unfavorable recommendations in the long-run.
Green (2006) found that market participants with early access to recommendation
revisions earn more from downgrades than from upgrades. My study in this chapter
employs this market reaction asymmetry to measure analysts’ over-optimism. This
measure provides two advantages over the measure of distribution asymmetry. First, this
measure reflects how investors would discount analysts’ over-optimism and is less likely
to be subjected to analysts strategic manipulation on the ratings distributions to satisfy
mandatory disclosure requirements (Chan et al., 2014; C.-Y. Chen & Chen, 2013).
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Second, this measure concerns the economic value of the recommendations and is more
relevant to investors’ decisions on whether analysts’ recommendations contain value.
In the next section, I introduce the data used in my study and present a descriptive
statistical analysis on the sample data.

2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The recommendation data in this study is obtained from the detailed file of the
I/B/E/S database and covers the period from the 01-Jan-1998 to 31-Dec-2015. My sample
data only considers the US stocks issued by the US analysts4. The data file contains the
following information: the date of the recommendation announcement, the time of the
announcement, the level of the recommendation rating, the identification code of the
recommended stocks, an analyst code, and the code for the brokerage firm that hires the
analyst. The I/B/E/S database applies a five-point scale measurement for the
recommendation ratings, in which 1 denotes ‘Strong Buy’, 2 for ‘Buy’, 3 for ‘Hold’, 4 for
‘Sell’, and 5 for ‘Strong Sell’. I exclude records that contain missing stock code and
records that contain non-identifiable analysts. In the case that one analyst revises his/her
recommendation ratings on the same stock on the same date, I only keep the last
recommendation for that date. Existing literature finds that recommendation revisions
provide more informative value than the pure recommendation ratings (B. M. Barber et
al., 2010; Casey, 2013; Francis & Soffer, 1997). Therefore, I also track the
recommendation history to get the information of revision. For each recommendation, if
there is no prior recommendation issued by the same analyst on the same stock, or if the

4

I/B/E/S assumes that US analysts only issue recommendations on US stocks and foreign
analysts only issue recommendations on foreign stocks.
10

most recent recommendation issued by the same analyst on the same stock is more than
180 calendar days old, then I treat that recommendation as an “Initiation”. If the most
recent recommendation on the same stock by the same analyst is less than 180 calendar
days old, then I compare the current rating and previous rating to determine whether this
recommendation is a “Reiteration”, “Upgrade” or “Downgrade”. If the current rating is
equal to previous rating, then the recommendation is coded as “Reiteration”. If the
current rating has a higher numeric rating value, then it is coded as “Downgrade”, e.g. a
change from “Hold” (3) to “Sell” (4) is a “Downgrade”. Otherwise, the recommendation
is coded as “Upgrade”. Then, I merge my recommendation sample with the CRSP
database to obtain the information of historical stock return and stock sector/industry
classification, which will be used for the event analysis.
My final data sample contains 409,696 observations, which are issued by 4,030
different analysts on 10,038 different stocks. Table 2.1 presents the frequency
distribution for the recommendations used in this chapter.
Panel A reports the contingency table based on recommendation revisions.
Consistent with the findings in existing literature (B. M. Barber et al., 2006; B. M. Barber
et al., 2010; Chan et al., 2014; C.-Y. Chen & Chen, 2013; Jegadeesh et al., 2004),
favorable recommendations are more prevalent. Based on ratings, “Strong Buy/Buy”
recommendations account for 50% of the total observations, while “Strong Sell/Sell”
ratings are less than 10%. Based on revisions, upgrades and downgrades have roughly the
same amount (32.2% and 34.9%). The combination of new initiations of “Strong
Buy/Buy” and upgrades reaches 46.2%, and the combination of new initiations of
“Strong Sell/Sell” and downgrades is only 36.0%.
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Panel B presents the frequency distribution of the recommendation timing. Since
both the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq National Market operate regularly
from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., recommendations issued before 9:30 a.m. on a trading day
are treated as “before-market” recommendations and recommendations issued after 4:00
p.m. from Monday to Thursday are treated as “after-close” recommendations, and all
other after-hour recommendations are treated as “weekend” recommendations. From the
result, we can see that analysts strategically adjust their recommendation timing to
capture investors’ attention and most recommendations are issued before the exchange
market opens or during the market operations. Only 5.4% of recommendations are issued
during the weekend and recommendations are evenly distributed across weekdays.
Panel C presents the frequency distribution of recommendations by the
capitalization of the recommended stocks and shows that analysts prefer following stocks
with large market capitalization. Overall, the results of Panel B and Panel C both indicate
that analysts are prone to cover large capitalized stocks and to issue recommendations
when investors’ attentions are high.
In the next section, I discuss how I employ the event analysis method to examine
the abnormal return and abnormal volume associated with analysts’ recommendations.

12

Table 2.1 Frequency Distribution of Analysts’ Recommendations
Panel A: Frequency Distribution by Level of Rating Change
CURRENT RATING
PREVIOUS
RATING
Strong Buy
Buy
Hold
Sell
25,204
32,175
35,823
3,289
NULL
(6.15%)
(7.85%)
(8.74%)
(0.8%)
13,013
20,732
36,613
807
Strong Buy
(3.18%)
(5.06%)
(8.94%)
(0.2%)
18,469
23,998
50,590
2,165
Buy
(4.51%)
(5.86%)
(12.35%)
(0.53%)
28,070
38,815
33,204
13,191
Hold
(6.85%)
(9.47%)
(8.1%)
(3.22%)
511
1,515
11,069
3,505
Sell
(0.12%)
(0.37%)
(2.7%)
(0.86%)
554
224
5,690
571
Strong Sell
(0.14%)
(0.05%)
(1.39%)
(0.14%)
TOTAL
85,821
117,459
172,989
23,528
(20.95%)
(28.67%)
(42.22%)
(5.74%)
Panel B: Frequency Distribution by Recommendation Timing
WEEKDAY
RECOMMENDATION
TIMING
SUN
MON
TUE
WED
16,781
16,567
16,191
AFTER-MARKET
CLOSE
(4.1%)
(4%)
(4%)
10,281
WEEKEND
(2.5%)
32,971
32,664
34,450
BEFORE-MARKET
OPEN
(8.1%)
(8%)
(8.4%)
26,365
30,556
32,397
DURING-MARKET
OPERATION
(6.4%)
(7.5%)
(7.9%)
TOTAL
10,281
76,117
79,787
83,038
(2.5%) (18.6%) (19.5%) (20.3%)
Panel C: Frequency Distribution by Stock Capitalization
Capitalization
# of Stocks
Mega Cap (>$200B)
31
Big/Large Cap ($10B-$200B)
868
Mid Cap ($2B-$10B)
2740
Small Cap ($30M-$2B)
6166
Micro/Nano Cap (<$30M)
6844

THR
17,166
(4.2%)
34,927
(8.5%)
30,126
(7.4%)
82,219
(20.1%)

# of Rec
1913
72398
119495
154432
61458

Strong Sell
1,315
(0.32%)
921
(0.22%)
377
(0.09%)
5,990
(1.46%)
702
(0.17%)
594
(0.14%)
9,899
(2.42%)

FRI
9,098
(2.2%)
34,713
(8.5%)
31,849
(7.8%)
75,660
(18.5%)

TOTAL

SAT
2,594
(0.6%)
2,594
(0.6%)

97,806
(23.87%)
72,086
(17.59%)
95,599
(23.33%)
119,270
(29.11%)
17,302
(4.22%)
7,633
(1.86%)
409,696
(100%)

TOTAL
66,705
(16.3%)
21,973
(5.4%)
169,725
(41.4%)
151,293
(36.9%)
409,696
(100%)

# Rec per Stock
61.71
83.41
43.61
25.05
8.98

Note: The numbers in the parentheses represent the relative proportion of each type of recommendations
to the total number of records in the data.
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2.3 Research Method
The event analysis approach has been widely adopted by many empirical
researchers in finance, economics and other business disciplines for studying the
instantaneous market reactions around the time that a certain type of event takes place
(MacKinlay, 1997). This method is particularly important in testing the market efficiency
in capital market research (Kothari & Warner, 2004). The basic idea is to find the
abnormal return or abnormal trading volume attributable to the event being studied after
adjusting for the fluctuation of price/volume stemming from the market. In this chapter, I
use event analysis to evaluate the abnormal return and abnormal volume associated with
analysts’ recommendations and compare those market reactions based on different
recommendation categories to assess analysts’ over-optimism.
In the event analysis, each recommendation denotes an individual event. To
correctly evaluate analysts’ informative value leading to a stock price movement rather
than an analysts’ piggybacking on the observed price fluctuation, I choose the event time
t=0 as the date that when an investor can exercise investment activity based on the
observed recommendation. Therefore, for before-market recommendations and duringmarket-operation recommendations, the announcement date has an event time t=0; for
any other after-hour recommendations, the next available trading date has the event time
t=0. Both price reactions and volume reactions are examined within a [-T, +T] trading
day window. For each event k, I calculate the cumulative abnormal return  and the
buy-and-hold abnormal return  to measure the price reaction. Equation 2.1 and
Equation 2.2 presents the formula to calculate the two types of abnormal returns.
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where , is the daily abnormal return of event ! on date ", , is the daily return of
the stock related to the event ! on date " in the defined event window, and 

,

is the

benchmark return for the recommended stock on date " in the event window. The
benchmark return is the hypothesized normal return for the underlying stock assuming
that no event occurred. In this study, I use two specifications for the benchmark. One
specification uses the actual return from a market portfolio and the other specification
uses an equilibrium return from an asset pricing model. For the specification that uses
actual market portfolio return, I consider two market portfolios. One portfolio is the
value-weighted market index as provided by the CRSP database, and the other market
portfolio is a size, book-to-market, and momentum decile matched portfolio. For the
specification that uses model implied returns, I consider three often referenced asset
pricing models: the CAPM model (Jensen, Black, & Scholes, 1972), the three-factor
model (Fama & French, 1993) and the four-factor model (Carhart, 1997).
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the timeline for examining the price reactions in the
event analysis. The estimation window before each event is used to fit the asset pricing
models and assesses the “normal” return in the event window. Equation 2.3 to Equation
2.5 specify the three asset pricing models respectively.
(#$%&)



= ' -. − /0 2 + 3 + /0

(44)

(2.3)

 = '5 -. − /0 2 + '6 78 + '9 8: + 3 + /0
(#;< ;<)



(2.4)

= '5 -. − /0 2 + '6 78 + '9 8: + '> 8?8 + 3 + /0 (2.5)
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where . is the rate of return for the market portfolio as given by the CRSP valueweighted market index, and /0 denotes the risk-free asset rate of return as given by the
yield of one-month Treasury bill. 78 is the difference between the return on the
portfolio of “small” capitalized stocks and “big” capitalized stocks, 8: is the difference
between the return on the portfolios of “high” and “low” book-to-market stocks, and
8?8 is the difference between the return on a portfolio of past one-year “winners” and
“losers”5. The parameter 3 represents the excess return for the underlying asset, and
parameter '@ denotes the sensitivity to each corresponding factor.
In this study, I obtain the value of coefficient '′B based on a regression in a [-60, 15] trading-day estimation window and I use the next [-14, -T-1] trading-day window as
the gap between the event window and the regression estimation window, which attempts
to avoid any bias due to the market information in the estimation period reaching the
event window.
Figure 2.1 Illustration of the Timeline for Event Analysis

To examine the volume reactions, I apply the methods that are similar to
(Womack, 1996) to measure the abnormal volume. For each recommendation k with a [-

5

For detailed definitions, see (Carhart, 1997).
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T, +T] trading-day window, the event abnormal volume C?: is calculated by
equation 2.6.
C?: =

D
∑LMF HIJK, L
EFGD LMNF
D
(∑LMNF
HIJK, L ∑LMFGDQ
HIJK, L )
LMF
OP LMNFNDQ

(2.6)

where CRS,  is the trading volume of the recommended stock for each recommendation
k at date t6.
After obtaining the abnormal return and abnormal volume for each individual
event, the next step is to assess whether those market reactions exhibit statistical
significance. In this study, I apply the Patell’s Z test (Patell, 1976), a cross-sectional ttest (S. J. Brown & Warner, 1985), the BMP test (Boehmer, Masumeci, & Poulsen,
1991), and a skewness-adjusted t-test (Hall, 1992) to examine the statistical significance
regarding both CAR and BHAR. To perform these statistical tests, the standardized AR
(SAR) and standardized CAR (SCAR) are calculated by the following formulas:
7, =
7 =

$TK,L
UH;<VWXY Z
K
#$TK

U[K ∗H;<VWXY Z
K

(2.7)
(2.8)

where ]$TK is the residual of the regression model when estimating the coefficient '′B for
different asset pricing models for event k, and ^ is the number of trading days in the [-T,
T] event window for event k. The standardization of the ARs and CARs reduces the
extreme influence of stocks with high variance in the statistical tests and adjusts the
standard error by the forecast-error in the out-of-sample predictions of the abnormal
returns in the event window.

6

I also consider the adjustment for stock split and reverse split when taking the actual day trading
volume CRS,  .
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The Patell’s Z test assumes cross-sectional independence in the abnormal return
as well as the absence of event-induced variance change during the event period. The test
statistic _%;JJ follows a standard normal distribution, and it is calculated as follow:
_%;JJ,$TL =
_%;JJ,#$T =

∑a
KMD `$TKL
b NcND

K
U∑a
KMDb NcNO

K
D a
∑KMD `#$TK
a
bK NcND
D
U∑a
KMDb NcNO
a
K

(2.9)
(2.10)

where M is the total number of recommendations within the sub-category, 7 is the
number of non-missing return observations in the estimation period of event k. and p is
the number of explanatory variables used in the benchmark regression model. _%;JJ,$TL
is used for testing d :  = 0, and _%;JJ,#$T is used for testing d :  = 0.
The cross-sectional test considers the change of abnormal return variance due to
the event itself, but still assumes no cross-sectional dependence in the abnormal returns.
The cross-sectional test is applicable to ARt, CAR, and BHAR. To conduct this test, the
following formulas are used to calculate the test statistics:
D a
∑
$TKL
a KMD

"#`,$TL =
"#`,#$T =
"#`,ij$T =

E
D
D
∑a g$TKL  ∑a
$TKL h
a(aND) KMD
a KMD
D a
∑
#$TK
a KMD

U

E
D
D
∑a g#$TK  ∑a
#$TK h
a(aND) KMD
a KMD
D a
∑
ij$TK
a KMD

U

E
D
D
∑a gij$TK  ∑a
ij$TK h
a(aND) KMD
a KMD

U

(2.11)
(2.12)
(2.13)

where the above statistics follow a t-distribution with M-1 degrees of freedom. "#`,$TL ,
"#`,#$T , "#`,ij$T are used to test d :  = 0, d :  = 0, and d :  = 0,
respectively.
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The BMP test (Boehmer et al., 1991) addresses the violation of the assumptions
on no cross-sectional dependence and it is robust to the variance induced by the event.
The calculation of the test statistic for this test is provided as below:
_i&%,$TL =

_i&%,#$T =

D a
∑
`$TKL
a KMD

(2.14)

E
D
D
∑a g`$TK  ∑a
`$TK h
a(aND) KMD
a KMD

U

D a
∑
`#$TK
a KMD

(2.15)

E
D
D
∑a g`#$TK  ∑a
`#$TK h
a(aND) KMD
a KMD

U

Like Patell’s Z test, the test statistic for the BMP test follows a standard normal
distribution. _i&%,$TL is used to test d :  = 0, and _i&%,#$T is used to test d :  =
0.
The skewness-adjusted t-test (Hall, 1992) corrects the cross-sectional t-test for
skewed abnormal return distributions. In the long-horizon, buy-and-hold returns tend to
be right-skewed (Kothari & Warner, 2004), thus resulting in a bias to long-horizon
abnormal performance test statistics (B. M. Barber & Lyon, 1997). To correct this
skewness bias, the following adjustment is applied to the cross-sectional t-test
for d :  = 0, and d :  = 0, respectively.
ob,oXY

"kl,#$T = √8 n

√&

ob,tuXY

"kl,ij$T = √8 n

√&

ob,oXY 6

5

+ 9 p#$T V
5

√&

5

6
Z + 6q p#$T
V

ob,tuXY 6

+ 9 pij$T V

√&

5

ob,oXY 9
√&

5

Z + r& p#$T s
ob,tuXY 9

6
Z + 6q pij$T
V

√&

(2.16)
5

Z + r& pij$T s

(2.17)
where p#$T and pij$T are the unbiased skewness estimator of CAR and BHAR over the
8 recommendations. "#`,#$T is specified by (2.12) and "#`,ij$T is specified by (2.13).
Both test statistics are asymptotically standard normal distributed.
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To assess whether there is significant volume change around recommendation
announcements, I first apply the natural log function to CAVOL and then perform the
cross-sectional t-test to test the hypothesis d : Sv(C?:) = 0. To align with previous
studies, I group the recommendation events based on both recommendation ratings and
on recommendation revisions.

2.4 Results and Discussion
In this section, I present the two results based on my event analysis. The first
result is about the statistical tests that examine the recommendation effectiveness. The
second result provides additional details with regard to the market reaction asymmetries.
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Table 2.2 Stock Price Reactions to Analysts’ Recommendations in a [-1, +1] tradingday window, with benchmark return from Carhart 4-factor Model
Panel A: Abnormal Returns Based on Recommendation Ratings
Level of Ratings
Strong Buy
Buy
Hold
CAR
2.29%
.84%
-2.26%
a***; b***
a***; b*** a***; b***

Sell
-3.47%
a***; b***

Strong Sell
-4.22%
a***; b***

BHAR

2.29%

.83%

-2.25%

-3.45%

-4.25%

n

c***; d***
84,490

c***; d***
115,287

c***; d***
169,184

c***; d***
23,085

c***; d***
9,700

Panel B: Abnormal Returns Based on Recommendation Revisions
Updated Rating
Strong
Buy
Buy
Hold
Previous Rating
CAR
2.08%
.76%
-2.24%
a***; b***
a***; b***
a***; b***
None
BHAR
2.07%
.76%
-2.24%
c***; d***
c***; d***
c***; d***
n
57,882
78,480
112,854
CAR
.16%
-3.13%
-4.71%
a; b
a***; b***
a***; b***
Strong
BHAR
.12%
-3.12%
-4.68%
Buy
c; d
c***; d***
c***; d***
n
4,292
8,478
13,182
CAR
2.76%
-.14%
-4.4%
a***; b***
a; b
a***; b***
Buy
BHAR
2.74%
-.14%
-4.39%
c***; d***
c*; d*
c***; d***
n
9,203
9,431
20,989
CAR
3.61%
3.38%
-.13%
a***; b***
a***; b***
a***; b***
Hold
BHAR
3.62%
3.39%
-.15%
c***; d***
c***; d***
c**; d**
n
12,590
17,982
12,385
CAR
4.06%
4.48%
2.87%
a***; b***
a***; b***
a***; b***
Sell
BHAR
4.01%
4.52%
2.88%
c***; d***
c***; d***
c***; d***
n
216
803
6,245
CAR
3.49%
2.07%
2.52%
a***; b***
a***; b**
a***; b***
Strong
BHAR
3.39%
1.85%
2.53%
Sell
c***; d***
c**; d**
c***; d***
n
307
113
3,529
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Sell
-3.32%
a***; b***
-3.3%
c***; d***
13,612
-8.01%
a***; b***
-7.59%
c***; d***
283
-6.73%
a***; b***
-6.63%
c***; d***
947
-4.39%
a***; b***
-4.37%
c***; d***
6,080
.18%
a; b
.18%
c; d
1,796
-.12%
a; b
-.2%
c; d
367

Strong Sell
-4.17%
a***; b***
-4.17%
c***; d***
5,354
-8.09%
a***; b***
-7.94%
c***; d***
397
-3.11%
a***; b***
-3.15%
c***; d***
172
-4.53%
a***; b***
-4.63%
c***; d***
3,085
-1.21%
a**; b
-1.22%
c**; d**
423
-1.22%
a**; b*
-1.31%
c; d
269

Panel C: Abnormal Returns Based on Revisions with the Same Level of Rating Change
Recommendation Action
Downgrade
Upgrade
Level of Rating Change
-4.06%
3.08%
CAR
a***; b***
a***; b***
1
-4.05%
3.08%
BHAR
c***; d***
c***; d***
35,970
33,797
n
CAR
-4.79%
3.42%
a***; b***
a***; b***
2
BHAR
-4.78%
3.44%
c***; d***
c***; d***
n
17,214
16,922
CAR
-6.16%
3.38%
a***; b***
a***; b***
3
BHAR
-5.91%
3.26%
c***; d***
c***; d***
n
455
329
CAR
-8.09%
3.49%
a***; b***
a***; b***
4
BHAR
-7.94%
3.39%
c***; d***
c***; d***
n
397
307
Note: The Patell Z (denoted by a) and the BMP Z (denoted by b) are applied to examine the significance of
CAR. Cross-Sectional T (denoted by c) and Skewness-Adjusted Cross-Sectional T (denoted by d) are
applied to examine the significance of BHAR. The benchmark return is calculated from a Carhart fourfactor model.
*** indicates a p-Value <0.01 for a two-tailed test
** indicates a p-value <0.05 for a two-tailed test
* indicates a p-value <0.1 for a two-tailed test

2.4.1 Recommendation Effectiveness
Table 2.2 presents the results of the price reaction for my main analysis. In the
main analysis, I apply a [-1, +1] trading-day event window and use the four-factor
Carhart model to calculate the benchmark return. Panel A displays the results based on
recommendation rating. Consistent with findings documented by prior literature,
favorable ratings such as “Strong Buy/Buy” are associated with significant positive
abnormal returns and unfavorable ratings such as “Sell/Strong Sell” and neutral rating
“Hold” are associated with significant negative abnormal returns. Increasing the level of
optimism (pessimism) for the favorable (unfavorable) recommendations increases the
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magnitude of the abnormal return. Panel B presents the results based on recommendation
revision. The first row in the table shows the new initiations, the rest of the cells represent
reiterations and revisions. The new initiations exhibit patterns that are similar to the
results based on recommendation ratings. The insignificant abnormal returns for
reiterations demonstrate that there is little informative value for a confirmation of
analysts’ own past recommendations, which is consistent to the findings by Asquith,
Mikhail, and Au (2005); Francis and Soffer (1997). For revisions, upgrades are typically
associated with significant positive abnormal return while downgrades are associated
with negative abnormal return. Panel C groups the upgrades and downgrades by the same
level of rating change and the result shows that increasing the level of rating change also
increases the magnitude of the abnormal returns, regardless of prior rating. Dhiensiri,
Mandelker, and Sayrak (2005) used the US stock samples over the period of 1992-2001
to examine the relationship between the market reaction and the magnitude of rating
change at the brokerage firm level and they did not find sufficient evidence to support
that the magnitude of the price change responded to the level of rating change. However,
with a more comprehensive data sample, my study shows that there is an obvious positive
relationship between the magnitude of the price response and the level of rating change.
Table 2.3 Volume Reactions to Analysts’ Recommendations in a [-1, +1] TradingDay
Panel A: Abnormal Volume Based on Recommendation Ratings
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
:Rw(C?:)
n

Strong Buy
18.73%***
86,621

Buy
16.34%***
118,423

Hold
28.2%***
170,833

Sell
27.69%***
23,134

Panel B: Abnormal Volume Based on Recommendation Revisions
Updated Rating
Previous Rating
Strong Buy
Buy
Hold
Sell
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 14.76%*** 13.14%*** 25.57%*** 25.22%***
Null :Rw(C?:)
n
59,956
81,561
114,457
13,660
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Strong Sell
34.48%***
9,729

Strong Sell
34.89%***
5,375

Strong Buy
Buy
Hold
Sell
Strong Sell

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
:Rw(C?:)
n
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
:Rw(C?:)
n
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
:Rw(C?:)
n
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
:Rw(C?:)
n
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
:Rw(C?:)
n

9.23%***
4,308
26.74%***
9,226
34.36%***
12,607
41.51%***
217
29.65%***
307

24.64%***
8,482
5.26%***
9,456
32.05%***
18,008
33.36%***
803
5.59%
113

46.61%***
13,191
44.15%***
20,999
2.01%***
12,396
34.8%***
6,252
30.%***
3,538

52.44%***
283
57.19%***
947
34.68%***
6,081
7.68%***
1,796
6.72%***
367

71.22%***
397
30.26%***
172
36.21%***
3,093
5.48%**
423
.61%
269

Panel C: Abnormal Volume Based on Revisions with the Same Level of Rating Change
Recommendation Action
Downgrade
Upgrade
Level of Rating Change
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
1
:Rw(C?:)
37.5%***
30.84%***
n
35,985
33,853
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
2
:Rw(C?:)
45.32%***
33.4%***
n
17,231
16,948
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
3
:Rw(C?:)
44.06%***
29.21%***
n
455
330
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
4
:Rw(C?:)
71.22%***
29.65%***
n
397
307
Note: Cross-Sectional T is applied to examine the significance of CAVOL.
*** indicates a p-Value <0.01 for a two-tailed test
** indicates a p-value <0.05 for a two-tailed test
* indicates a p-value <0.1 for a two-tailed test

Table 2.3 presents the result of the volume analysis for analysts’
recommendations. The percentage number in the table reflects the magnitude of the
abnormal trading volume within the event window relative to the normal volume. Panel
A presents the abnormal volume based on recommendation ratings. “Strong Sell” ratings
trigger the highest abnormal volume and “Buy” ratings have the lowest abnormal
volume. Panel B presents abnormal volume based on recommendation revisions. The
reiteration of a “Strong Sell” rating is associated with the lowest abnormal volume, and
this abnormal volume is also not significant partially due to the small sample size within
that category. The highest abnormal volume is found in the downgrade from “Strong
Buy” to “Strong Sell”, where the trading volume increases by 71% around the
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recommendation announcement. Generally, trading volumes are found to be higher for
downgrades than upgrades. Panel C demonstrates the results by grouping
upgrades/downgrades by the same level of rating change. The abnormal volume exhibits
a similar pattern to the abnormal return.
Figure 2.2 Market Reaction by the Same Level of Rating Change
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80.00%

4.00%

70.00%

2.00%

60.00%

0.00%

50.00%

-2.00%

40.00%

-4.00%

30.00%

-6.00%

20.00%

-8.00%
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Abnormal Volume
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Market Reaction by Level of Rating Change

0.00%
1

2

3

Level of Rating Change
DOWNGRADE(AVOL)
DOWNGRADE(CAR)

4
UPGRADE (AVOL)
UPGRADE(CAR)

Note: the abnormal volume is measured by log(CAVOL), represented by the bar chart and scaled by the
right axis, the abnormal return is measured by the BHAR, represented by the line chart and scaled by the
left axis. Both CAVOL and BHAR are calculated from a [-1, +1] event window, and for BHAR the
benchmark return is obtained from Carhart Model.

Error! Reference source not found. summarizes the market reactions by the s
ame levels of rating change and this figure clearly shows that downgrades consistently
yield stronger market reactions than upgrades in both volume and price change.
In unpresented results, I also performed the event analysis based on a [-1, +3], [3, +3], and [-5, +5] trading-day window, and used alternative asset pricing models (the
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CAPM model, the Fama-French Three-Factor model) and two market portfolio returns (a
value-weighted market portfolio, and a size/BM ratio/momentum decile-matched
portfolio) to obtain the benchmark returns. The conclusions regarding the properties of
the market reactions remain unchanged. In the rest part of this section, I will present
results that are related to the market reaction asymmetry.

2.4.2 Market Reaction Asymmetries
As illustrated by the results from the event analysis, it is obvious that the market
responds asymmetrically to analysts’ recommendations. The magnitudes of the abnormal
returns for upgrades are generally lower than those for downgrades at the same level of
rating change, e.g. a new “Strong Buy” underperforms a new “Strong Sell” and a new
“Buy” underperforms a new “Sell”. This market reaction asymmetry also persists in the
comparison between any matched pair of revisions. An upgrade from rating i to rating j
consistently underperforms its corresponding downgrade from rating j to rating i. For
example, in Panel B of Table 2.2, an upgrade from “Buy” to “Strong Buy” is associated
with a CAR of 2.76% and a BHAR of 2.74%, while the corresponding downgrade from
“Strong Buy” to “Buy” has much stronger price reactions (-3.13% for CAR and -3.12%
BHAR).
To assess the statistical significance of the market reaction asymmetry, I
performed a two-sample t-test on each paired favorable and unfavorable
recommendations. Table 2.4 displays the results of the t-test. Most of these market
reactions exhibit statistical significance regarding the asymmetric abnormal returns. In
this study, I use the value of the t-statistic to denote the magnitude of the asymmetry.
Panel A shows that the market reaction asymmetry between the new “Sell” and new
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“Buy” is larger than the asymmetry between new “Strong Sell” and new “Strong Buy”.
Panel C shows that the asymmetry for small level of rating change is larger than revisions
with larger level of rating changes. These two findings indicate that analysts exhibit more
over-optimistic bias in issuing minor revisions than they do for radical revisions, which is
consistent with the multinomial probit models proposed by Bernhardt et al. (2016). Panel
B shows the results based on the comparison between matched-pair revisions. The two
most significant market reaction asymmetries are found between upgrade/downgrade
concerning “Strong Sell” and “Hold” and upgrade/downgrade concerning “Buy” and
“Hold”. Although, a “Hold” rating literally means neutral market performance and
provides ambiguous support for a buy-sell investment decision, analysts tend to use a
“Hold” rating as a cushion to circumvent a direct “Sell” opinion. As a result, “Hold”
ratings are more likely to suffer from analysts’ over-optimistic bias and the small level of
change revisions with target rating “Hold” exhibit the most significant market reaction
asymmetry.
In summary, the pattern of market reactions to analysts’ recommendations is
consistent. Due to analysts’ over-optimism, investors discount analysts’ favorable
recommendations, which leads to a weaker market reaction to the favorable
recommendations.

2.4.3 Profiling the Over-optimism
To deepen the understanding of analysts’ over-optimism, I also explore the trend
of the market reaction asymmetry across the dimensions of the financial market situation,
analysts' experience and stock characteristics. I perform a two-sample test on the
subsamples based on the quintile of each dimension.
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Table 2.4 presents the profiling of analysts’ over-optimism. Panel A exhibits the
market reaction asymmetry based on the quintile of the VIX index. The VIX index is the
markets’ expectation of 30-day volatility and it is widely used to measure market risk and
investor’ sentiment. As demonstrated by the result, the market reaction displays stronger
asymmetry when the VIX index is high (quintile 4 and quintile 5) and the asymmetry
becomes insignificant when VIX index is in low quintile (quintile 1). When the financial
market is full of uncertainty, analysts’ information appears to be more valuable to
investors and investors are more responsive to analysts’ negative recommendations (Loh
& Stulz, 2014), which amplifies the market reaction asymmetry. Panel B presents the
result of the asymmetry based on analysts’ experience when issuing the
recommendations. For new initiations of “Buy/Sell” recommendations, there is no
significant difference among the five quintiles. However, for revisions with one and two
levels of rating changes, analysts with experience between one year and ten years exhibit
the most obvious over-optimistic bias while analysts with the longest experience
demonstrate the least over-optimism. This reversed U-Shape pattern regarding analysts’
over-optimistic bias relative to their experience is consistent with the findings that
inexperienced analysts are more likely to receive punishment for their inaccurate
forecasts (Hong et al., 2000), therefore novice analysts put high weight on the accuracy in
their recommendations and demonstrate less over-optimistic bias. Analysts with
extremely rich career experiences in providing financial research tend to achieve the
greatest accuracy in their recommendations, therefore they generate less price asymmetry
and yet still maintain high volume asymmetry. Panel C presents the market reaction
asymmetry by the size of the stock capitalization. There is almost no over-optimistic bias
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found for Mega Cap stocks while the most significant asymmetries are found in Mid Cap
stocks and Small Cap stocks. This finding implies that analysts’ over-optimism rises as
they have the advantage in receiving private information of the recommended firms.
Consequently, analysts are more influential over small cap stocks and those stocks are
also more likely to contain an over-optimistic bias.
Overall, my results provide rich evidence to show that analysts’ recommendations
are associated with an asymmetric market reaction and this market reaction asymmetry is
closely tied to analysts’ experience, market situation, and stock capitalization.
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Table 2.4 Examination of Market Reaction Asymmetries
Panel A: T-Test of Market Reaction for New Initiations
Recommendation #
Unfavorable Favorable
(1)
(2)
Sell vs. Buy
2,192
24,613
Strong Sell vs. Strong Buy
999
19,356

Odds
(1/2)
0.089
0.052

Panel B: T-Test of Market Reaction for Revisions (Niche Pairs)
Recommendation #
Downgrade
Upgrade
Odds
(1)
(2)
(1/2)
Buy vs. Strong Buy 17,043
15,077
1.130
Hold vs. Strong Buy 31,988
24,621
1.299
Sell vs. Strong Buy 661
431
1.534
Strong Sell vs. Strong Buy 797
485
1.643
Hold vs. Buy 41,971
32,582
1.288
Sell vs. Buy 1,719
1,234
1.393
Strong Sell vs. Buy 316
176
1.795
Sell vs. Hold 10,320
8,922
1.157
Strong Sell vs. Hold 5,234
5,005
1.046
Strong Sell vs. Sell 460
376
1.223

BHAR
Unfavorable Favorable
(3)
(4)
2.7%
0.8%
2.8%
1.8%

Downgrade
(4)
3.8%
5.0%
7.9%
7.8%
4.7%
7.8%
4.2%
4.5%
5.0%
1.5%

Panel C: T-Test of Market Reaction for (Same level of Rating Change)
Recommendation #
Downgrade
Upgrade
Odds
Downgrade
(1)
(2)
(1/2)
(4)
1 level
69,794
56,957
1.225
4.4%
2 level
38,941
30,860
1.262
5.1%
3 level
977
607
1.610
6.7%
4 level
797
485
1.643
7.8%
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BHAR
Upgrade
(5)
2.8%
3.8%
3.8%
3.8%
3.5%
4.6%
1.6%
3.2%
3.0%
0.5%

Diff
(3-4)
1.9% (8.39***)
1.0% (3.28***)

Diff
(4-5)
0.9%(7.68***)
1.3%(11.87***)
4.1%(5.39***)
3.9%(4.24***)
1.2%(13.63***)
3.2%(5.00***)
2.6%(2.38**)
1.3%(7.33***)
2.0%(7.32***)
1.1%(1.61)

BHAR
Upgrade
(5)
3.3%
3.7%
3.1%
3.8%

Diff
(4-5)
1.2%(17.55***)
1.5%(14.88***)
3.5%(5.65***)
3.9%(4.24***)

Unfavorable
(5)
14.9%
19.3%

Downgrade
(7)
29.5%
55.1%
56.7%
77.1%
50.4%
64.9%
37.4%
38.6%
42.1%
14.9%

Abnormal Volume
Favorable
Diff
(6)
(5-6)
4.5% 10.4% (7.65***)
6.9% 12.4% (5.83***)

Abnormal Volume
Upgrade
Diff
(8)
(7-8)
27.8%
1.7%(2.16**)
36.2%
18.9%(32.35***)
36.3%
20.3%(4.72***)
35.5%
41.6%(9.18***)
34.2%
16.1%(32.10***)
35.7%
29.2%(10.25***)
13.2%
24.2%(3.01***)
38.1%
0.5%(0.57)
33.2%
8.9%(6.76***)
11.5%
3.4%(0.84)

Downgrade
(7)
43.3%
53.8%
50.4%
77.1%

Abnormal Volume
Upgrade
Diff
(8)
(7-8)
33.0% 10.3%(26.81***)
35.7% 18.1%(34.31***)
29.6%
20.8%(5.34***)
35.5%
41.6%(9.18***)

Note: The sign of BHAR for unfavorable recommendations (new “Sell/Strong Sell”, and Downgrades) are reversed. Column 6 and column 9 report the
difference of the market reactions and report the corresponding t statistics in the bracket. ***, **, * indicates significance level of 0.01, 0.05, and .10
respectively.
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Table 2.5 Market Reaction Asymmetries by the Quintile of VIX Index, Analysts’ Experience, Stock Capitalization
Panel A: Asymmetry and T-test by VIX Quintile
Quintile 1
(<13.29)
BHAR
AVOL
New Initiation
Diff
Diff
0.0%
8.6%
Buy / Sell
(0.13)
(2.55**)
Strong Buy / Strong
0.1%
8.4%
Sell
(0.08)
(1.48)
BHAR
AVOL
Revision
Diff
Diff
0.2%
11.8%
1 Level Rating Change
(1.60) (11.09***)
0.2%
17.0%
2 Level Rating Change
(1.10) (12.93***)
4.2%
28.6%
3 Level Rating Change
(2.33**)
(2.15**)
3.9%
45.2%
4 Level Rating Change
(2.21**)
(4.04***)

Quintile 2
(13.29 - 16.13)
BHAR
AVOL
Diff
Diff
0.3%
7.3%
(0.85)
(2.17**)
0.9%
28.1%
(1.19)
(4.84***)
BHAR
AVOL
Diff
Diff
0.5%
13.5%
(3.02***) (13.11***)
1.0%
20.6%
(4.60***) (15.60***)
2.0%
28.6%
(1.36)
(2.80***)
-1.5%
72.3%
(-0.64)
(5.40***)

Panel B: Asymmetry and T-test by Analysts’ Experience (Year)
Quintile 1
Quintile 2
(<1.68)
(1.68 - 3.64)
BHAR
AVOL
BHAR
AVOL
New Initiation
Diff
Diff
Diff
Diff
2.3%
12.1%
1.9%
8.0%
Buy/Sell
(5.14***) (4.50***) (3.91***)
(2.70***)
0.4%
11.6%
1.1%
17.9%
Strong Buy/ Strong Sell
(0.85) (3.01***)
(1.70*)
(3.98***)
BHAR
AVOL
BHAR
AVOL
Revision
Diff
Diff
Diff
Diff
1.5%
10.4%
1.5%
9.1%
1 Level Rating Change
(6.51***) (8.10***) (8.24***)
(9.44***)

Quintile 3
(16.14 - 19.70)
BHAR
AVOL
Diff
Diff
0.1%
8.6%
(0.30)
(2.68***)
-0.4%
7.4%
(-0.66)
(1.78*)
BHAR
AVOL
Diff
Diff
0.3%
8.4%
(2.46**)
(9.23***)
0.6%
17.7%
(2.83***) (14.50***)
3.6%
20.8%
(2.51**)
(2.42**)
1.3%
35.6%
(0.75)
(3.16***)

Quintile 4
(19.71 -24.38)
BHAR
AVOL
Diff
Diff
2.7%
14.4%
(3.89***)
(4.11***)
1.5%
6.5%
(2.25**)
(1.42)
BHAR
AVOL
Diff
Diff
1.6%
12.3%
(11.75***) (15.19***)
2.3%
20.4%
(11.23***) (16.94***)
4.5%
23.9%
(3.48***)
(2.75***)
3.8%
42.2%
(1.84*)
(4.01***)

Quintile 5
(>24.38)
BHAR
AVOL
Diff
Diff
3.6%
11.4%
(8.24***)
(4.91***)
2.2%
13.2%
(3.05***)
(3.46***)
BHAR
AVOL
Diff
Diff
1.9%
8.0%
(14.33***) (12.08***)
2.5%
15.9%
(10.36***) (16.77***)
3.3%
16.6%
(3.00***)
(2.60***)
7.2%
31.8%
(3.89***)
(4.46***)

Quintile 3
(3.64 - 5.93)
BHAR
AVOL
Diff
Diff
1.8%
11.0%
(3.56***)
(3.56***)
1.7%
8.7%
(1.99**)
(1.71*)
BHAR
AVOL
Diff
Diff
1.5%
11.1%
(11.36***) (13.78***)

Quintile 4
(5.94 -9.21)
BHAR
AVOL
Diff
Diff
2.2%
6.3%
(4.19***)
(2.09**)
1.3%
11.9%
(1.73*)
(2.34**)
BHAR
AVOL
Diff
Diff
1.3%
9.5%
(9.57***) (12.63***)

Quintile 5
(>9.21)
BHAR
AVOL
Diff
Diff
0.9%
14.0%
(1.64)
(3.99***)
0.9%
13.5%
(1.06)
(2.36**)
BHAR
AVOL
Diff
Diff
0.3%
11.2%
(2.82***) (15.11***)
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2 Level Rating Change
3 Level Rating Change
4 Level Rating Change

1.8%
(4.35***)
2.1%
(0.67)
5.7%
(2.21**)

18.6%
(8.36***)
24.1%
(1.37)
42.2%
(2.45**)

2.2%
(8.10***)
6.5%
(3.68***)
7.3%
(3.63***)

19.1%
(13.00***)
19.4%
(1.98**)
24.0%
(1.96*)

Panel C: Asymmetry and T-test by Market Capitalization
Mega Cap
Big/Large Cap
(>$200B)
($10B-$200B)
BHAR
AVOL
BHAR
AVOL
New Initiation
Diff
Diff
Diff
Diff
0.4% (13.2%)
0.8%
5.4%
Buy/Sell
(0.60)
(-1.26) (2.83***)
(2.16**)
0.8%
(8.1%)
0.4%
2.7%
Strong Buy/ Strong Sell
(0.68)
(-0.97)
(1.00)
(0.64)
BHAR
AVOL
BHAR
AVOL
Revision
Diff
Diff
Diff
Diff
0.5%
(3.2%)
0.7%
5.0%
1 Level Rating Change
(1.28)
(-0.98) (7.86***)
(7.72***)
0.7%
10.0%
1.0%
11.0%
2 Level Rating Change
(1.46)
(1.93*) (8.20***) (11.51***)
3.2%
8.7%
1.7%
11.3%
3 Level Rating Change
(0.72)
(0.38)
(1.38)
(1.55)
(3.2%) (56.7%)
3.2%
27.4%
4 Level Rating Change
(.***)
(.***)
(2.58**)
(3.44***)

2.1%
(9.71***)
4.0%
(3.04***)
2.8%
(1.72*)

20.1%
(17.47***)
22.8%
(2.66***)
41.7%
(4.94***)

Mid Cap
($2B-$10B)
BHAR
AVOL
Diff
Diff
1.5%
8.1%
(5.56***)
(3.90***)
0.8%
13.3%
(2.22**)
(4.25***)
BHAR
AVOL
Diff
Diff
0.6%
7.7%
(6.48***) (12.75***)
0.5%
12.7%
(4.12***) (14.91***)
2.2%
17.1%
(2.45**)
(3.16***)
0.9%
21.9%
(0.71)
(3.06***)

Note:

1.6%
(7.66***)
3.4%
(2.59**)
6.1%
(4.37***)

17.1%
(17.50***)
12.0%
(1.46)
35.0%
(4.44***)

Small Cap
($30M-$2B)
BHAR
AVOL
Diff
Diff
2.3%
12.3%
(6.75***)
(5.76***)
1.3%
16.2%
(2.63***)
(4.89***)
BHAR
AVOL
Diff
Diff
1.2%
12.3%
(10.74***) (18.87***)
1.5%
20.8%
(9.33***) (24.45***)
4.6%
23.8%
(4.33***)
(3.53***)
3.0%
40.5%
(1.86*)
(5.38***)

0.5%
(2.96***)
2.0%
(2.14**)
-0.6%
(-0.20)

16.9%
(18.27***)
26.6%
(4.41***)
56.4%
(5.56***)

Micro/Nano Cap
(<$30M)
BHAR
AVOL
Diff
Diff
3.9%
15.1%
(3.35***)
(2.64***)
2.3%
10.4%
(1.80*)
(1.39)
BHAR
AVOL
Diff
Diff
1.7%
12.9%
(6.19***)
(9.28***)
2.4%
23.4%
(5.65***) (12.75***)
3.5%
26.0%
(1.82*)
(2.10**)
5.3%
61.1%
(1.86*)
(4.08***)

The t-statistic is calculated in the same way as in Table 6, which is the measurement of market reactions to the unfavorable
recommendations minus those to the favorable recommendations. Quintile values for the VIX index are based on the historical index
value. Quintile values for analysts’ experience are based on the year of the recommendation since analyst’s first record in IBES
database. Numbers in the brackets represent the t-value of the test, and ***, **, * indicates significance level of 0.01, 0.05, and .10
respectively.
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2.5 Summary
Financial analysts provide stock recommendations that contain useful information
for investors to make investment decisions. However, investors also recognize that
analysts’ recommendations are not free of bias. Due to analysts’ over-optimism, the value
of analysts’ favorable recommendations is impaired when compared to their unfavorable
recommendations.
In this chapter, I focused on the study of the market reaction asymmetry, which
implies how strongly investors discount analysts’ over-optimistic bias in their favorable
recommendations. I find that the market reaction asymmetry is consistent across different
definitions of “favorable/unfavorable” recommendations. Based on the recommendation
ratings, “Strong Buy” recommendations underperform “Strong Sell” and “Buy”
recommendations underperform “Sell”. Based on recommendation revisions, “Upgrade”
underperforms “Downgrade” at the same level of rating change as well as at a matched
pair comparison. Analysts tend to have higher over-optimism when issuing a minor
revision, which results in the recommendation revision with one-level of rating change
exhibiting the highest market reaction asymmetry.
The level of over-optimism also varies across different dimensions. Based on the
years of experience, analysts with mid-range of experience are more over-optimistic than
experienced analysts and novice analysts. Based on the financial market situations,
analysts are more likely to issue biased recommendations when the uncertainty of the
market is high. Based on the market capital size associated with the recommendations,
analysts exhibit more over-optimism for stocks with small capitalization value that are
difficult to analyze.
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CHAPTER 3 : ANALYSTS’ OVER-OPTIMISM AND REGULATION
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, investors notice that financial analysts have the
issue of over-optimism and discount the bias in their favorable recommendations, which
results in a market reaction asymmetry between the favorable recommendations and
unfavorable recommendations. My finding of this market reaction asymmetry provides a
good way to measure the perceived bias due to analysts’ over-optimism. In this chapter, I
begin to examine the dynamics of the market reaction asymmetry and investigate
regulatory efforts taken to address the issue of over-optimism.
Utilizing a time-series structural change detection algorithm, I demonstrate that
analysts’ over-optimism has experienced significant reductions around both the year of
2002 and year of 2007. For the change of the over-optimism in 2002, it can be partially
attributed to a series of regulation rules adopted to address the issue of conflicts-ofinterest. For the change of the over-optimism in 2007, I attribute it to a “Self-Correction”
mechanism of the financial market, in which analysts tend to be more conservative and
less over-optimistic during post-crisis periods.
Using a difference-in-differences approach, I evaluate those two impacts on the
over-optimism and I find that the actual reduction of the over-optimism due to regulation
only accounts for 50% of the total over-optimism reduction. My findings provide
important insights into the studies that examine policy evaluation. Given the presence of
the “Self-Correction” mechanism identified in my study, some researchers might overestimate the policy effect if the post-regulation period in their study is too short.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, I provide a
brief background and literature review. In Section 3.2, I discuss the research methods that
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are used to identify the change of over-optimism and evaluate its effect. Section 3.3
presents the results and discussion. Section 3.4 concludes this chapter.

3.1 Background and Literature Review
Before discussing how regulations can affect analysts’ over-optimism, it is
important to note that analysts may have different types of over-optimism. In this study, I
adopt the framework of Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014), which attributed analysts’
over-optimism into two major categories. One category of the over-optimism is a
conscious distortion, where analysts realize the bias in their favorable recommendations
but still choose to issue biased recommendations due to their conflicts-of-interest. The
other category is the unconscious distortion, which states that analysts have the cognitive
and behavioral bias and they don’t realize that their favorable recommendations exhibit
over-optimism bias. Consistent with the conscious distortion due to conflicts-of-interest,
a large body of research finds that misaligned incentives result in analysts’
recommendations containing an upward bias. Securities and Commission (2010) listed
several factors that create potential conflicts-of-interest: investment banking
relationships, brokerage commissions, analysts’ compensation, or ownership interest in
the relevant companies. These conflicts-of-interest impose pressure on sell-side analysts
and inevitably allure analysts to issue biased recommendations. Michaely and Womack
(1999) found that the long-run post-recommendation performances of the stocks
recommended by underwriter analysts are significantly worse than the performances of
stocks recommended by other brokerage firms. Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006)
found that in addition to the underwriting activity, trade generation also leads to an
upward distortion. Agrawal and Chen (2008) showed that the level of optimism in the
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recommendations is positively related to the magnitude of the conflicts-of-interest and
the over-optimistic bias from the Investment Banking relationship was especially
pronounced during the stock market bubble. B. M. Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007)
found that favorable recommendations from the investment banks underperform those
from independent research firms. Ertimur, Muslu, and Zhang (2011) focused on the
coverage initiations and they find that the long-run performance of stocks given “Strong
Buy” initiations underperform non-initiations “Strong Buy” and that conflicts-of-interest
dominate the cause for favorable recommendations. On the other hand, analysts can also
exhibit unconscious distortion which can be identified by their self-selection of the stocks
that they want to cover (McNichols & O'Brien, 1997). Regardless of the root cause of the
over-optimism, biased recommendations result in asymmetry. This over-optimistic bias is
potentially harmful to investors, as it reduces the informative value of analysts’
recommendations and hinders the information efficiency of the financial market. In this
study, I use the market reaction asymmetry to measure analysts’ over-optimism and
examine the dynamics of the over-optimism.
In the aftermath of the Dot-com bubble, which occurred late in 2002, policy
makers realized the severity of analysts’ over-optimism and their biased
recommendations. Consequently, several regulatory initiatives were implemented to
address this issue. NASD Rule 2711 (2002) “Research Analysts and Research Report”
and NYSE Rule 472 (2002) “Communications with the Public”7 were introduced to
improve the transparency of analysts’ research and explicitly reminded investors of

7

NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 are no longer applicable, both rules have been
superseded by FINRA Rule 2241 since Sept. 25, 2015.
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analysts’ over-optimism. The regulations implicitly forced analysts to issue less favorable
recommendations. The two rules require brokerage firms to disclose the percentage of
“buy”, “hold”, or “sell” recommendations in each research report by their employed
analysts. At the same time, the Global Research Analyst Settlement (2002) was
announced, which sanctioned 10 of the largest investment banks in the US and used $450
million out of the total $1.435 billion in penalties to support independent research.
All of these rules primarily aimed to resolve the issue of analysts’ conflicts-of-interest,
which is related to the category of conscious distortion in analysts’ recommendations.
Researchers document findings that these regulatory efforts had an impact on reducing
analysts’ over-optimistic behaviors. Chan et al. (2014) found that the implementation of
NASD Rule 2711 changed the buy/sell ratio of analysts’ recommendations and
contributed to the reduction of optimistic stock ratings. Kadan et al. (2009) found that
following the Global Analyst Research Settlement, NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule
472, optimistic recommendations became less frequent and more informative. Clarke et
al. (2011) demonstrated that NASD Rule 2711, NYSE Rule 472, and the Global Research
Settlement had a significant impact on the recommendation performance by independent,
affiliated, and unaffiliated analysts. All three types of analysts issued fewer favorable
ratings following the regulation, however as an unintended consequence, the downgrades
became less informative in the post-regulation period. DONG and HU (2016) found that
NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 enhanced the transparency of analysts’
information and effectively reduced analysts’ optimistic bias. However, they found that
analysts adopted a different form of distortion by strategically timing the release of
unfavorable ratings.
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Studies that focus on the category of unconscious distortion are rare in existing
literature. Remarkable studies that explicitly treat over-optimism as a cognitive bias can
be found in the research by Eames, Glover, and Kennedy (2002); Easterwood and Nutt
(1999); MokoaleliϋMokoteli, Taffler, and Agarwal (2009). Easterwood and Nutt (1999)
find that analysts underreacted to negative information and overreacted to positive
information, which they attributed to analysts’ systematic optimism. Similarly, Eames et
al. (2002) document that analysts’ earnings forecasts errors exhibit significant optimistic
bias in conjunction with buy recommendations. MokoaleliϋMokoteli et al. (2009) adopt
the tone of language used in the recommendation reports as a proxy for over-optimism,
and they find that new buy recommendations are significantly associated with overoptimistic bias when compared to new sell recommendation. Due to the presence of this
“genuine” optimism, they claim that the regulatory attempts to address the issue of
conflicts-of-interest may have very limited impact on analysts’ behavior.
In this study, I build my work on this framework of the two-category overoptimism and identify two critical dates that denote over-optimism reduction. One
identified critical date is associated with the both rule adoption and a major financial
crisis (Dot.com bubble), and the other critical date is only associated with another major
financial crisis and cannot be associated with any regulatory actions. By comparing the
level of over-optimism reduction for the two critical dates, I separate the “genuine”
regulatory impact that addresses the conflicts-of-interest issue from the “Self-Correction”
mechanism due to analysts’ voluntarily reducing the unconscious distortion after a
financial crisis. In the next section, I discuss the time-series change point detection
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method for identifying the critical dates and the difference-in-differences model for
evaluating the level of over-optimism change.

3.2 Methodology and Data Sample
3.2.1 Examination of the Dynamics of Analysts’ Over-optimism Through A
Structural Break Change Detection
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, analysts can exhibit different levels of overoptimism across recommendation ratings and revisions. It is also reasonable to anticipate
that any regulatory effort may also have a different impact on the reduction of overoptimism across different levels of recommendation ratings and revisions. For example,
given the mandatory regulatory requirement, analysts may avoid issuing an extremely
optimistic rating such as “Strong Buy” but still demonstrate a high level of overoptimism in minor revisions. Alternatively, analysts may need some extra time to adapt
themselves to issue more unfavorable recommendations, e.g. redefining the criteria to
issue a “Sell” rather than a “Hold”. As a result, the over-optimism across different
recommendation categories may have its own pattern to respond to the regulation rules.
To correctly capture the versatile dynamics of analysts’ overall over-optimism across
different recommendation categories, I employ a multivariate time-series change point
detection method to identify the critical dates when the level of total over-optimism
experienced a structural change. This multivariate time-series change point detection
technique (Matteson & James, 2014; Zamba & Hawkins, 2006) nicely accounts for the
inequality and asynchrony of the regulatory impact on different recommendation
categories, and it identifies when the most significant structural changes of the overoptimism take place (critical date).
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To begin with the critical dates detection, I first generate a multivariate timeseries that represents the market reaction asymmetries across different recommendation
categories. In my main analysis, I use a buy-and-hold abnormal return BHAR within a [1, +1] trading-day window to measure the short-term market reactions to analysts’
recommendations. Then I aggregate the short-term market reactions by different
categories at the year-month level. After that, I apply a spline interpolation to impute
missing values. Analyst’ over-optimism is reflected by the asymmetric market reactions
to favorable and unfavorable recommendations, in terms of the ratings (Buy vs. Sell;
Strong Buy vs. Strong Sell), the matched pair revisions (Upgrade from a to b vs.
Downgrade from b to a), or the revisions by the same level of rating change. Therefore, I
calculate the difference of mean BHAR for each month based on the corresponding
recommendation categories8. The resulting monthly time-series data of the mean BHAR
difference is used as the input to detect the critical dates of the structural change. For
example, in Feb-2008, the one-level, two-level, and three-level favorable revisions have
an average BHAR of 3.13%, 2.95% and 4.44% respectively; while the corresponding
unfavorable revisions are associated with an average BHAR of -5.89%, -4.45% and 13.16%. These market reactions are equivalent to three series: 2.76%, 1.50% and 8.72%
for each revision asymmetry. I repeat the calculation for each month and for each
matched-pair comparison to derive the multivariate time-series asymmetries.
There are numerous algorithms that perform change point detection based on
multivariate time-series data.(Bai, 1997; J. Chen & Gupta, 1995; Matteson & James,
2014; Perreault, Parent, Bernier, Bobee, & Slivitzky, 2000; Zamba & Hawkins, 2006). In

8

I reverse the sign of BHAR, so a positive BHAR indicates an effective recommendation.
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this study, I use the technique proposed by James and Matteson (2013). The algorithm is
based on a divergence measure (Rizzo & Székely, 2010; Szekely & Rizzo, 2005) that
assesses whether two independent random vectors are identically distributed and the
bisection method (Vostrikova, 1981) that hierarchically identifies the location of the
change points. I choose this method because it uses a non-parametric approach that does
not require any assumptions regarding the distribution of the underlying random
variables. This algorithm also produces a fast estimation of both the number and location
of the change points. In this study, I used the R package “ecp” to perform the analysis
and examine the structural change regarding the mean of the asymmetries.9.

3.2.2 Evaluation of the Over-optimism Change through A Difference-in-Differences
Model
After obtaining the critical dates that represent the structural change in the timeseries data for BHAR asymmetries, I use a difference-in-differences model to evaluate
whether the change is associated with a reduction of over-optimism. The main analysis of
the difference-in-differences model is specified in Equation (3.1).
;,k, = 'd + '5 yRB";,k, ∗ ?z";,k, + '6 yRB";,k, + '9 ?z";,k, +
{| }~;,k, + {/ }~ + v~B"/ }~k, + ;,k, (3.1)
where the dependent variable ;,k, is the buy-and-hold abnormal return in a [-1, +1]
trading-day window associated with the recommendation issued by analyst a, on stock s,
at date t. yRB";,k, is a binary variable indicating whether the recommendation is issued
during the period after the detected change point. ?z";,k, is a binary variable indicating

9

For detailed discussion of the techniques, see the R package document: https://cran.rproject.org/web/packages/ecp/ecp.pdf
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whether the recommendation is a favorable recommendation, i.e. recommendation that
contains over-optimism. Based on the findings in Chapter 2, I exclude all the reiterations
and define the following recommendations as “favorable”: new initiations of “Strong
Buy/Buy” and recommendations with an Upgrade revision. All other recommendations
are treated as unfavorable and the value of OPT is 0. To make BHAR measure the
effectiveness of the recommendations, I reverse the sign of unfavorable
recommendations. {| }~ controls for recommendation categories. {/ }~
and v~B"/ }~ control for the fixed-effect in the difference-in-differences
model. I cluster the errors at individual analyst’s level.
'5 is the difference-in-differences coefficient, which denotes the actual impact on
the over-optimism. A positive '5 implies that during the post-change point period, the
effectiveness of the “favorable” recommendations improves relative to the “unfavorable”
recommendations and the market reaction asymmetry (the effectiveness gap between
favorable and unfavorable recommendations) reduces. In other words, if there is a
reduction of analysts’ over-optimism associated with the detected change point, then I
should expect a positive '5 from the regression.
Existing analyst literature also identifies that the effectiveness of analysts’
recommendations can be attributed to some other variables such as their working
experience, the size of their employer and the complexity of their job tasks (Clement,
1999); whether the underlying stock belongs to growth firms and small firms (Loh &
Stulz, 2011); the performance of financial market and economic situations (Loh & Stulz,
2014); as well as the timing of recommendations (DONG & HU, 2016) and the boldness
of the recommendation ratings (Jegadeesh et al., 2004). I perform the difference-in-
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differences analysis by using a full model specification that includes all those factors.
This model is specified in Equation (3.2).
;,k, = 'd + '5 yRB";,k, ∗ ?z";,k, + '6 yRB";,k, + '9 ?z";,k, +
{| }~;,k, + {/ }~ + v~B"/ }~k, + 8 7k, +
8 k, + y;, + 7 ?C;, + ? 7;, + C +
^C:k, + 8^ }~;,k, + ?^ };,k, + ;,k, (3.2)
In this full model, the stock characteristics are captured by 8 7k, and
8 k, . 8 7k, is the market capitalization value for stock s when the
recommendation is issued on date t, 8 k, is the equity beta in the CAPM
model for stock s at data t. Analysts’ characteristics are captured by y;, ,
7 ?C;, , and ? 7;, . y;, denotes the analyst’s working
experience at date t, which is the number of years since the date of the analyst’s first
observations in the I/B/E/S database. 7 ?C;, is the measurement of
analyst’s current work load, which is proxied by the number of different stocks covered
by analyst a in the previous month of date t. ? 7;, is the number of total
analysts employed by the brokerage firm that hires analyst a within the same calendar
year. C is the VIX index at date t and it captures the characteristics of the financial
market in terms of the uncertainty and investors’ sentiment. Additional characteristics
regarding the individual recommendations are captured by ^C:k, ,
8^ }~;,k, and ?^ };,k, . ^C:k, is the number of days since the
previous recommendation issued by any analyst on stock s prior to date t.
8^ }~;,k, is a dummy variable indicating whether the recommendation is
issued during a weekend or during market operations or during a weekday after-hours.
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?^ };,k, is the difference between the recommendation rating by analyst a, on
stock s, at date t, and the consensus rating of stock s, at date t.
Based on a similar model specification as (3.2), I set the Post binary variable to
indicate the period after the adoption of NASD Rule 2711, NYSE Rule 472 and the
Global Research Analyst Settlement. This model allows me to evaluate the regulatory
impact on the market reaction asymmetry regardless of the date of any significant
structural change detected for the time-series data.

3.2.3 Data Sample
I use the same data sample as Chapter 2 to evaluate the dynamics of analysts’
over-optimism. Information about the stock characteristics are obtained from CRSP
database. Table 3.1 presents the yearly trend of the recommendation distribution.
Consistent with previous findings regarding the impact of NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE
Rule 472, analysts tend to issue fewer recommendations after 2002 (B. M. Barber et al.,
2006; Chan et al., 2014; C.-Y. Chen & Chen, 2013). In addition, the Buy/Sell ratio
remains stable around 4 to 6 through the post-regulation period. Based on the number of
observations for each year, missing records should not be a major concern.
Table 3.1 Recommendation Distribution by Year
YEAR
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Strong Buy
6379
(1.56%)
6827
(1.67%)
6382
(1.56%)
5622
(1.37%)
6855
(1.67%)
4837

Buy
9112
(2.22%)
8949
(2.18%)
8344
(2.04%)
8343
(2.04%)
10540
(2.57%)
6471

RATING
Hold
7628
(1.86%)
6676
(1.63%)
6100
(1.49%)
7762
(1.89%)
14473
(3.53%)
12662

Sell
349
(0.09%)
427
(0.1%)
270
(0.07%)
397
(0.1%)
2730
(0.67%)
2261
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Strong Sell
291
(0.07%)
257
(0.06%)
145
(0.04%)
209
(0.05%)
669
(0.16%)
877

TOTAL
23759
(5.8%)
23136
(5.65%)
21241
(5.18%)
22333
(5.45%)
35267
(8.61%)
27108

Buy/Sell
Ratio
24.32
24.12
35.99
23.51
5.13
3.64

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
TOTAL

(1.18%)
4657
(1.14%)
4636
(1.13%)
4352
(1.06%)
4583
(1.12%)
5429
(1.33%)
4907
(1.2%)
4775
(1.17%)
4676
(1.14%)
3273
(0.8%)
2673
(0.65%)
2532
(0.62%)
2426
(0.59%)
85821
(20.95%)

(1.58%)
5816
(1.42%)
5156
(1.26%)
5873
(1.43%)
6082
(1.48%)
5690
(1.39%)
5336
(1.3%)
5490
(1.34%)
6292
(1.54%)
5724
(1.4%)
4752
(1.16%)
5053
(1.23%)
4436
(1.08%)
117459
(28.67%)

(3.09%)
11340
(2.77%)
10263
(2.51%)
11315
(2.76%)
11089
(2.71%)
12526
(3.06%)
10892
(2.66%)
9792
(2.39%)
9752
(2.38%)
9307
(2.27%)
7926
(1.93%)
6754
(1.65%)
6732
(1.64%)
172989
(42.22%)

(0.55%)
1595
(0.39%)
1397
(0.34%)
1628
(0.4%)
1406
(0.34%)
2148
(0.52%)
1950
(0.48%)
1187
(0.29%)
1382
(0.34%)
1475
(0.36%)
1099
(0.27%)
856
(0.21%)
971
(0.24%)
23528
(5.74%)

(0.21%)
865
(0.21%)
668
(0.16%)
823
(0.2%)
895
(0.22%)
1262
(0.31%)
994
(0.24%)
470
(0.11%)
439
(0.11%)
319
(0.08%)
293
(0.07%)
190
(0.05%)
233
(0.06%)
9899
(2.42%)

(6.62%)
24273
(5.92%)
22120
(5.4%)
23991
(5.86%)
24055
(5.87%)
27055
(6.6%)
24079
(5.88%)
21714
(5.3%)
22541
(5.5%)
20098
(4.91%)
16743
(4.09%)
15385
(3.76%)
14798
(3.61%)
409696
(100%)

4.34
4.88
4.30
4.81
3.31
3.51
6.41
6.20
5.25
5.74
7.80
5.98
6.23

Note: The numbers in the parentheses represent the relative proportion of each type of recommendations to
the total number of records in the data.

3.3 Results and Analysis
3.3.1 Regulation Effect without Change Point Analysis
Table 3.2 presents the results of the difference-in-differences analysis that
examines the effect of the regulation rules regardless of the actual structural change. In
this model, I define Jun-04, 2002 as the date that separates pre-regulation period and
post-regulation period.10 Panel A presents the regression results that I control for the
recommendation category by matched-pair of revisions (upgrade from rating i to j vs.
downgrade from j to i). Panel B presents the regression result that I control for

10

NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 are both adopted by this date.
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recommendation category by revisions with the same level of rating change (upgrade by
k level vs. downgrade by k level). For each panel, Model (1) shows a baseline model;
Model (2) presents Equation 3.1; Model (3) adds the control variable for stock
characteristics to Model (2); Model (4) adds the control variables for analysts’
characteristics to Model (3); Model (5) further controls for market uncertainty; Model (6)
is the full model as specified by Equation 3.2.
Table 3.2 yields several important findings. First, the adoption of NASD Rule
2711 and NYSE Rule 472, as indicated by the coefficient for Post*OPT, is associated
with a significant reduction in the market reaction asymmetry. This conclusion is
consistent across Model (1) to Model (6), which indicates that resolving the issue of
conflicts-of-interest leads to a reduction of the market reaction asymmetries. Second, the
estimated coefficients for the control variables provide insight into the understanding of
analysts’ recommendation effectiveness. FIRM SIZE is in a negative relationship with
BHAR and FIRM BETA is in a positive relationship with BHAR, which is consistent with
the findings that influential recommendations are more likely to occur for growth firms
and small firms (Loh & Stulz, 2011). In examining analysts’ characteristics, there is a
significant positive relation between the price reaction and analysts’ experience,
indicating that gaining experience improves analysts’ influential capacity. It is hard to
determine whether analysts’ work load affects their performance, as TASK COVERAGE
has an insignificant coefficient, which suggests that task coverage does not affect the
recommendation effectiveness. BROKER SIZE proxies for the resources that analysts can
obtain from their employer. The result indicates that analysts coming from big research
firms have more influential capacity to affect the stock price movement. The coefficient
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for VIX is significantly positive, which implies that when the market is full of fear and
uncertainty, analysts’ recommendations contain more informative value, thus more
effectively affect the stock price movement. This finding is consistent with the
hypotheses developed by Loh and Stulz (2014) stating that analysts work harder and
investors rely more on analysts’ research in bad times. Lastly, in the examination of the
recommendation characteristics, the estimation of the coefficient for Timing Dummy
indicates that after-hour recommendations are less influential than before-open
recommendations. This may indicate that analysts’ recommendations are more effective
when investor’s attention is higher. INTERVAL has a significant negative relation with
the price reaction, suggesting that analysts’ recommendations will be less influential if
the time gap to the previous recommendation is short. CONS DIFF has a significantly
positive coefficient, which confirms that market reaction is stronger for revisions that
move away from the consensus than those that move towards it (Jegadeesh & Kim, 2010;
Loh & Stulz, 2011).
As a robustness check, I estimated the full model using a quintile-based
regression. The quantile regression model accounts for the possibility that the ordinary
DID model might be biased due to the inclusion of some recommendations with extreme
market reactions. Table 3.3 presents the results of the quantile regression model. The
results still demonstrate a significant positive regulatory effect on reducing the market
reaction asymmetry. In addition, the signs of the control variables also remain the same
as the ordinary DID model. In summary, my findings confirm that NASD Rule 2711 and
NYSE Rule 472 mitigate analysts’ over-optimism and reduce the market reaction
asymmetry.
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Table 3.2 Evaluation of Regulatory Effect (Difference-in-Differences Model)
Panel A: DID Model (Rec Type: Matched Paired Revision)
Mode (1)
Model (2)
DV:
BHAR [-1, +1]
b/(se)
b/(se)
Post * Opt
0.02534***
0.02559***
(0.0015)
(0.0014)
Post
-0.02477***
-0.01533***
(0.0015)
(0.002)
Opt
-0.03079***
-0.03040***
(0.0014)
(0.0013)
Rec Dummy:
Yes
Yes
Year/Industry Fixed
Effect
FIRM SIZE
FIRM BETA

Yes

Model (3)
b/(se)
0.02336***
(0.0014)
-0.01525***
(0.0019)
-0.02759***
(0.0013)

Model (4)
b/(se)
0.02345***
(0.0014)
-0.01545***
(0.0021)
-0.02768***
(0.0013)

Mode (5)
b/(se)
0.02345***
(0.0014)
-0.01694***
(0.0021)
-0.02770***
(0.0013)

Model (6)
b/(se)
0.02356***
0.0014
-0.01654***
(0.0021)
-0.02661***
(0.0013)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

-0.00757***
(0.0002)
0.00550***
(0.0004)

-0.00770***
(0.0002)
0.00555***
(0.0004)
0.00027***
(0.0001)
-0.00029
(0.0002)
0.00017***
0

-0.00769***
(0.0002)
0.00556***
(0.0004)
0.00026***
(0.0001)
-0.00029
(0.0002)
0.00017***
0
0.00012***
0

-0.00782***
(0.0002)
0.00543***
(0.0004)
0.00028***
(0.0001)
-0.00028
(0.0002)
0.00022***
0
0.00012***
0
-0.00002***
0
0
(.)
-0.01054***
(0.0013)
0.01068***
(0.0007)
0.00680***

EXP
TASK COVERAGE
BROKER SIZE
VIX
INTERVAL
Timing:
after close
Timing:
after close/weekend
Timing:
before mkt open
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Timing:
during mkt op
CON DIFF

(0.0008)

Constant

0.03952***
(0.0014)

0.02948
(0.057)

0.05637
(0.0576)

Panel B: DID Model (Rec Dummy: Revision by the Same Level of Rating Change)
Mode (1)
Model (2)
Model (3)
DV:
BHAR [-1, +1]
b/(se)
b/(se)
b/(se)
Post * Opt
0.02860***
0.02907***
0.02752***
(0.0015)
(0.0015)
(0.0015)
Post
-0.02287***
-0.01585***
-0.01608***
(0.0015)
(0.002)
(0.0019)
Opt
-0.03963***
-0.04023***
-0.03881***
(0.0014)
(0.0014)
(0.0014)
Rec Dummy:
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year/Industry Fixed Effect
FIRM SIZE
FIRM BETA

Yes

Yes
-0.00712***
(0.0002)
0.00553***
(0.0004)

EXP
TASK COVERAGE
BROKER SIZE
VIX
INTERVAL
Timing:
after close
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0.05365
(0.0566)

0.05025
(0.0564)

0.00882***
(0.0005)
0.04748
(0.0533)

Model (4)
b/(se)
0.02747***
(0.0015)
-0.01632***
(0.0021)
-0.03837***
(0.0013)
Yes

Mode (5)
b/(se)
0.02747***
(0.0015)
-0.01809***
(0.0021)
-0.03837***
(0.0013)
Yes

Model (6)
b/(se)
0.02733***
(0.0015)
-0.01790***
(0.0021)
-0.03634***
(0.0013)
Yes

Yes
-0.00732***
(0.0002)
0.00562***
(0.0004)
0.00058***
(0.0001)
-0.00035
(0.0002)
0.00020***
0

Yes
-0.00729***
(0.0002)
0.00562***
(0.0004)
0.00058***
(0.0001)
-0.00035
(0.0002)
0.00019***
0
0.00014***
0

Yes
-0.00761***
(0.0002)
0.00536***
(0.0004)
0.00057***
(0.0001)
-0.00034
(0.0002)
0.00024***
0
0.00013***
0
-0.00002***
0
0
(.)
-0.00931***

Timing:
after close/weekend
Timing:
before mkt open
Timing:
during mkt op
CON DIFF
Constant

(0.0014)

0.05790***
(0.0014)

0.04932
(0.054)

0.07762
(0.0544)

0.07346
(0.0532)

0.06932
(0.0529)

0.01371***
(0.0008)
0.00912***
(0.0008)
0.00786***
(0.0005)
0.0643
(0.0498)

Note: Dependent variable BHAR is the Buy-and-hold abnormal return from the Carhart model and the sign of the Downgrades, Initiations of “Sell” & “Strong
Sell” recommendation is reversed. Post*Opt is the DID estimator of the regulatory effect in reducing the over-optimistic bias. Post is the indicator of the postregulation period. Opt is the indicator of the favorable ratings that are subjected to the over-optimistic bias and demonstrate inferior performance. RecType
Dummy controls for the recommendation type. For controls in stock characteristics: FIRM_SIZE is market capital value of the recommended stock, measured in
$M; BETA is the equity beta value of the recommended stock from the CAPM model. For controls in analysts’ characteristics: EXP is the working experience of
the analyst, measured as the # of years in the IBES data file; TASK_COVERAGE is the analyst’s current task complexity, measured as the # of covered stocks in
previous month; BROKER_SIZE is the size of the brokerage firm that the analyst is employed, measured as the # of analysts hired by the same brokerage firm in
previous year. For controls of market characteristics: VIX is the close price of the VIX index. For controls of recommendation characteristics: INTERVAL is the #
of days since the previous recommendation issued by any analyst on the same underlying stock; TimeDummy is the indicator of whether the recommendation is
issued “after close”, “in the weekend”, “before the market open”, or “during the market operation”; and CONS_DIFF is the difference between the individual
rating and the consensus ratings. The standard error is clustered at the analysts’ level. ***, **, * indicates significance level of 0.01, 0.05, and .10 respectively.
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Table 3.3 Evaluation of Regulatory Effect (Quantile-Based Difference-in-Differences
Model)
DV:
BHAR [-1, +1]
Post*Opt
Post
Opt
Time/Industry Fixed
Effect
FIRM SIZE
FIRM BETA
EXP
TASK COVERAGE
BROKER SIZE
VIX
INTERVAL
after close
after close/weekend
before mkt open
during mkt op
CON DIFF

Asymmetry Based on Same level of
Rating Change
b/(se)
0.00491***
(0.0004)
-0.00827***
(0.0003)
-0.00848***
(0.0002)
Yes

Asymmetry Based on
Matched Pair Revision
b/(se)
0.00403***
(0.0003)
-0.00765***
(0.0003)
-0.00479***
(0.0002)
Yes

-0.00338***
(0.0000)
0.00447***
(0.0001)
0.00074***
(0.0000)
-0.00056***
(0.0000)
0.00012***
(0.0000)
0.00021***
(0.0000)
-0.00000***
(0.0000)
0.00000
(.)
-0.00428***
(0.0004)
0.00858***
(0.0002)
0.00249***
(0.0002)
0.00328***
(0.0002)

-0.00358***
(0.0000)
0.00444***
(0.0001)
0.00058***
(0.0000)
-0.00049***
(0.0000)
0.00012***
(0.0000)
0.00022***
(0.0000)
-0.00000***
(0.0000)
0.00000
(.)
-0.00468***
(0.0003)
0.00729***
(0.0002)
0.00213***
(0.0002)
0.00385***
(0.0002)

Note: Dependent variable BHAR is the Buy-and-hold abnormal return in a [-1, +1] trading-day window,
benchmarked by the Carhart model, and the sign of the Downgrades, Initiations of “Sell” & “Strong Sell”
are reversed. The model structure is the same as the full model (Equation 3.2).
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3.3.2 Structural Change of Analysts’ Over-optimism
Table 3.1 indicates that the adoption of the regulation rules reduces the overoptimism as reflected by the recommendation distribution asymmetry. Table 3.2 and
Table 3.3 both suggest that the regulation rules reduce the over-optimism as reflected by
reduction in the market reaction asymmetry. During the post-regulation period, the yearly
“Buy/Sell” ratio remains relatively stable. However, we don’t know whether the market
reaction asymmetry also exhibits the same pattern in the post-regulation period. To
explore the dynamics of the market reaction, I employ the time-series change point
detection algorithm to identify critical dates when the market reaction asymmetry has a
structural shift and explore the question of “whether the regulatory effort in addressing
the conflicts-of-interest is the only factor that contributes to the reduction of analysts’
over-optimism?” If there is more than one significant change for the market reaction
asymmetry, then those dates that cannot be associated with the adoption of regulation
rules should provide valuable insights regarding the mitigation of over-optimism related
to unconscious distortion.
Table 3.4 presents the results for the detected critical dates and the evaluation of
their effect on over-optimism reduction. Panel A shows the result based on the
asymmetries by matched-pairs revisions and two major changes of the asymmetries are
detected. The first date is late in 2002, and the second date is between 2009 and 2010. To
verify whether this result is robust and consistent, I also use the BHAR [-1, +3] and
BHAR [-3, +3] as alternative measurements of the price reaction. The DID estimates
reveal that both structural changes are associated with a significant positive effect in
reducing the market reaction asymmetry. Panel B shows the result of analysis based on
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the asymmetry by revision with the same levels of rating change. Based on the price
reaction measurement by BHAR [-1, +1], the result is the same as the finding in Panel A.
When measuring the price reaction in a longer event window, the algorithm also
identifies another structural change around the year of 2007 and this structural change is
associated with a significantly negative DID coefficient.
My exploratory study on the dynamics of the market reaction asymmetries
provides several interesting findings. First, the market reaction asymmetry does not
remain the same during the post-regulation period and there is an incremental reduction
of the market reaction asymmetry around 2009-2010. The first identified date around the
year of 2002 can be associated with the adoption of NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule
472. The second identified date around 2010 is not associated with any regulation
actions. However, one common feature regarding both dates is that they both represent
the end of a major financial crisis. The year 2010 is associated with the end of the 2007
global financial crisis and the year 2002 is associated with the end of the Dot.com bubble
crisis. These findings strongly suggest that analysts tend to exhibit less over-optimism
during post-crisis periods, regardless of the regulation actions. In this study, I call this
finding the “Self-Correction” mechanism of the financial market and relate it to the
mitigation of over-optimism due to unconscious distortion. This mechanism is consistent
with the relationship between analysts’ over-confidence and irrationality and the
economic situation from a behavioral perspective (Grosse, 2017). Before the financial
crisis, analysts tend to be more irrational and truly over-optimistic about their forecasts.
After the experience of an extreme economic situation in a financial crisis, analysts tend
to be less confident and more conservative and cautious in issuing recommendations.

54

Therefore, the overall market reaction asymmetry is larger before the crisis and drops
significantly after the crisis. This explanation is also supported by the result in Panel B,
where the third identified date represents the beginning of a crisis and it is associated
with an increase of market reaction asymmetry. Second, the value of the estimated DID
coefficient indicates the amount of over-optimism reduction that can be attributed to the
“Self-Correction” mechanism and the amount that can be attributed to the regulatory
effort. Regardless of the event window used for the calculation of the BHAR, the DID
coefficient for the year of 2002 is consistently twice as large as that for the year of 2010.
The year 2002 is associated with two treatments in addressing analysts’ over-optimism,
the regulation and the “Self-Correction” mechanism. The year 2010 is only associated
with one treatment, the “Self-Correction” mechanism. Based on the magnitude of the
DID coefficients, the “Self-Correction” mechanism appears to be equally effective in
reducing analysts’ over-optimism as the regulatory effort. As indicated by Grosse (2017);
Rizzi (2015), analysts’ behavior can be affected by extreme situations faced in the
financial crisis period, one of the possible consequences may be an unconscious
reduction in the over-optimism. This finding is very important for the studies that
examine regulatory effectiveness or policy effects that concern analysts’ behavior. Due to
the presence of the “Self-Correction” mechanism, analysts’ over-optimism can
experience a systematic reduction even without a regulatory intervention. Failing to
consider this mechanism will ultimately result in the overestimation of the policy effects
if the rules are adopted at the time that a major financial crisis ends. The sample periods
for most existing studies on NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 are relatively short
(B. M. Barber et al., 2006; Casey, 2013; C.-Y. Chen & Chen, 2013; Clarke et al., 2011).
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When evaluating those conclusions, it is important to consider the potential risk of overestimation due to the “Self-Correction” mechanism.

3.4 Conclusion
Two categories of over-optimism are discussed in this chapter: the conscious
distortion due to conflicts-of-interest and the unconscious distortion due to behavioral
bias. I find that the regulatory actions NASD Rule 2711, NYSE Rule 472, and the Global
Financial Analyst Settlement, which address the issue of conflicts-of-interest, resulted in
reducing the market reaction asymmetry. However, the financial market also possesses a
“Self-Correction” mechanism that systematically rectifies analysts’ unconscious overoptimism during a major financial crisis. I demonstrate that both the “Self-Correction”
mechanism and regulatory efforts can play equally important roles in reducing the market
reaction asymmetry. Therefore, the evaluation of the regulatory effect can be overestimated if the “Self-Correction” mechanism has not been thoroughly accounted for.
This study contributes to the analyst literature by specifically focusing on the
dynamics of analysts’ over-optimism through the measurement of market reaction
asymmetry. My results connect the study of analysts’ over-optimism to regulatory effects
and to behavioral effects resulting from financial crises. The finding of the “SelfCorrection” mechanism is particularly important to academic researchers who want to
assess policy effects on financial markets.
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Table 3.4 Detected Structural Changes of the Market Reaction Asymmetries
Panel A: Detected Dates of Structural Change, based on Asymmetry by Matched Pairs
Price Reactions:
Price Reactions:
BHAR [-1, +1]
BHAR [-1, +3]
Date
DID Coefficient
Date
DID Coefficient
2002-12 ***
0.01699***
2002-12 ***
0.01642***
2009-06 ***
0.00894***
2010-03 ***
0.00868***

Price Reactions:
BHAR [-3, +3]
Date
DID Coefficient
2002-11 ***
0.02270***
2010-03 ***
0.01053***

Panel B: Detected Dates of Structural Change, based on Asymmetry by the Same Levels of Rating Change
Price Reactions:
Price Reactions:
Price Reactions:
BHAR [-1, +1]
BHAR [-1, +3]
BHAR [-3, +3]
Date
DID Coefficient
Date
DID Coefficient
Date
DID Coefficient
2002-12 ***
0.02665***
2002-08 ***
0.03008***
2002-08 ***
0.03648***
2009-06 ***
0.00964***
2007-08 ***
-0.00969***
2007-08 ***
-0.01313***
2010-03 **
0.01436***
2010-03 ***
0.01872***
Note: The input of the change point algorithm based on the asymmetry across niche pairs consists of the difference of the BHAR between any particular upgrade
from rating i to j and its corresponding downgrade from rating j to i, plus the difference of the BHAR between new initiation of “Sell” and new initiation of
“Buy”, the difference of BHAR between new initiation of “Strong Sell” and new initiation of “Strong Buy”, and the BHAR for new initiation of “Hold”. The input
of the change point algorithm based on the asymmetry across niche pairs consists of the difference of the BHAR between upgrade with k level of rating change
and its corresponding downgrade with k level of change, plus the difference of the BHAR between new initiation of “Sell” and new initiation of “Buy”, the
difference of BHAR between new initiation of “Strong Sell” and new initiation of “Strong Buy”, and the BHAR for new initiation of “Hold”. While in estimating
the DID coefficient, the new initiation of “Hold” is excluded. In estimating the DID coefficient measures, the pre-period is defined as the period from last change
point date to the current change point date and the post-period is from the current change point date to the next change point date.
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CHAPTER 4 : THE INVESTMENT VALUE OF ANALYSTS’
RECOMMENDATIONS
Investors expect analysts to produce valuable recommendations reflecting the
time and effort spent researching the companies they cover. Existing literature has
already discovered that analysts’ recommendations contain informative value as the
financial market responds to the recommendations (Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Jegadeesh &
Kim, 2006; Womack, 1996). In this chapter, I investigate the investment value of
analysts’ research from a practice-oriented perspective and construct different portfolios
to explore the profitability of following analysts’ recommendations. The goal of this
chapter is to compare different recommendation-based asset allocation strategies and
explore the marginal value of financial analysts’ recommendations.
The portfolio construction approach is a widely adopted research method that can
assess the profitability of financial analysts’ recommendations or earnings forecasts11.
However, existing literature provides little guidance upon the choice of the best strategy
to maximize the investment value from analysts’ recommendations. Therefore, my study
makes contributions to analyst literature in the following respects.
First, I provide a comparison of different portfolio construction strategies and
discuss the incremental profitability of switching from a passive portfolio strategy to an
active portfolio strategy. In this study, I compare three types of asset allocation strategies
that are common among investment practices: a passive asset allocation strategy, an
enhanced management strategy and an active asset allocation strategy. The passive asset

11

For example, see (B. Barber et al., 2001; B. M. Barber et al., 2006; B. M. Barber et al.,
2007; Jegadeesh & Kim, 2006)
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allocation strategy follows analysts’ recommendations to decide which stocks to buy/sell
and uses the stocks’ market capitalization weight to rebalance the portfolio. The active
asset allocation strategy adopts the Black-Litterman framework (Black & Litterman,
1992) to calculate a posterior stock return that blends analysts’ estimated return with an
implied equilibrium return extracted from observable market information. Then a meanvariance optimization procedure is used to obtain the stock weights for an optimal
portfolio that considers both return and risk. The enhanced portfolio strategy lies inbetween the passive strategy and the active strategy. In this strategy, the stock selection is
determined by analysts’ recommendations and the stock weighting is determined by a
mean-variance optimization process using only historical return estimates. Through the
portfolio performance evaluation, I find that the active strategy can achieve superior
performance over the passive and enhanced strategies.
Second, I identify that only recommendations with the information of a target
price estimate are effective in generating positive trading profit. The recommendations
without target price estimates create noisy trading signals, which impair the functionality
of the price discovery. Neither the passive portfolio strategies nor the active portfolio
trading strategies produce incremental profitability if the recommendations without target
price estimates are included in making investment decisions.
Lastly, I explore the performance attribution for different trading strategies. For
the most conservative long-only passive strategy, the active return over the benchmark
portfolio is mainly attributed to the selection effect. For the most aggressive active
strategy, the asset allocation effect and interaction effect dominate the abnormal return
over the benchmark. Analysts demonstrate superior performance in identifying the under-

59

valued stocks in the manufacturing sector and the abnormal return due to this selection
effect is consistent across different strategies. A passive portfolio strategy generates a
negative active return during a financial crisis period, while an active portfolio strategy is
less likely to be affected by the financial or economic conditions.
The main conclusions in this chapter are that the active trading strategy
outperforms the passive and enhanced portfolio management strategies for exploiting the
investment value of analysts’ recommendations and that the Black-Litterman model
allows investors to achieve this superior performance. This study is of interest to
practitioners who want to exploit the value of financial analysts’ reports and who desire
insights into portfolio designs that fit different investment needs. The study also offers
value to academic researchers who want to utilize a portfolio construction approach to
analyze the economic impact of analysts’ recommendations, as it points out that the
choice of the trading strategy significantly affects the recommendation-based portfolio
performance.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 provides a
literature review on the application of the portfolio construction approach. Section 4.2
describes the data sample. Section 4.3 discusses the research methods used in this study.
Section 4.4 performs empirical study and evaluates the portfolio performance and Section
4.5 concludes the chapter.

4.1 Literature Review
This article is primarily related to the study of analysts’ investment value.
Empirical papers that tackle this research topic generally adopt a passive portfolio
strategy to perform the study. B. Barber et al. (2001) created a portfolio based on
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analysts’ consensus ratings and they found that the portfolio based on analysts’
recommendations earned an abnormal return and the abnormal return diminished with
delayed actions and became insignificant after factoring in the transaction costs. In a
similar manner, B. M. Barber et al. (2007) designed portfolios based on recommendation
ratings issued by different types of analysts and revealed that analysts from independent
research firms outperformed investment banking analysts in issuing buy
recommendations while investment banking analysts had superior performance in Hold
and Sell recommendations. In a further study that examined the incremental value added
in analysts’ recommendations, B. M. Barber et al. (2010) showed that portfolios based on
both ratings and change of ratings had higher profitability than strategies utilizing only
one or the other. Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) compared both value-weighted and equalweighted portfolio construction strategies to assess the investment value of analysts’
recommendations across G7 countries and discovered that US analysts favor price
momentum stocks and generate the highest abnormal return. Groysberg et al. (2013)
designed two portfolios that follow both buy-side and sell-side analysts’
recommendations respectively. Their findings suggested that the portfolio formed from
buy-side analysts’ (Buy/Strong Buy recommendations) underperformed their sell-side
peers. However after accounting for the capital selection effect, there was no significant
difference between the two portfolios. Loh and Stulz (2014) constructed a daily
rebalanced portfolio that buys stocks receiving a revision two days after the
recommendation announcement and keeps the recommended stocks for only 20 days and
they found that financial crisis did not affect the profitability of the recommendations.
Hobbs et al. (2012) examined whether the frequency of recommendations affected the
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portfolio performance. They created portfolios based on the level of frequency, sources of
recommendations and types of recommendations. Their results indicated that analysts
who frequently updated recommendations generated the highest excess return, and this
result was consistent regardless of analysts’ experience, star status, number of stocks
covered and news event. Green (2006) constructed a portfolio that aimed to capture the
short-term investment value by holding the recommended stocks for no more than two
days. He demonstrated that early access to the recommendations produced economic
value and captured incremental profitability.
Compared with the rich studies that employed a passive portfolio construction
approach, it is relatively rare to see the application of an active asset allocation strategy in
current literature. Among the few attempts that explored an active portfolio construction
approach, the Black-Litterman model (Black & Litterman, 1992) played an important
role in defining the active asset allocation strategy. P. W. He, Grant, and Fabre (2013)
adopted the Black-Litterman model to study the economic value of analyst
recommendations in the Australian financial market. They constructed three separate
passive portfolios based on the consensus ratings and used the performance of the three
portfolios to proxy for analysts’ relative views regarding the expected return for the
recommended stocks. Through this approach, they demonstrated that stocks with
favorable consensus earn a higher risk-adjusted return than the market. While the BlackLitterman strategy earned significant abnormal return before transaction costs, the profit
became insignificant after controlling for transaction cost. Creamer (2015) proposed a
method to extract the views of analysts’ recommendations based on various external
sources such as news sentiment, accounting information in analysts’ recommendations,
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and corporate social network structures. Through the implementation of the BlackLitterman model, he found that the news sentiments-based Black-Litterman model
outperformed the corporate social connections-based Black-Litterman, and both BlackLitterman portfolios outperformed the market portfolio. L. Chen, Da, and Schaumburg
(2015) implemented the Black-Litterman model based on equity analysts’ 12-month
ahead target price forecasts on S&P 500 stocks. Their Black-Litterman model used an
equivalent formula and included the correlation between the analysts’ views and the
implied return. The resulting portfolio achieved superior performance over the market
index.
Existing literature has documented some findings that the Black-Litterman
framework can be superior over traditional mean-variance portfolio optimization.
Bessler, Opfer, and Wolff (2017) compared the performance of a Black-Litterman
portfolio, a traditional mean-variance portfolio and a naïve diversification portfolio with
the world equity assets data. They showed that the Black-Litterman portfolio
outperformed the mean-variance and naïve diversification portfolios and the BlackLitterman portfolio also exhibited less risk than the other two portfolios. Harris, Stoja,
and Tan (2016) proposed a Black-Litterman framework that incorporated time-varying
conditional distributions of returns and used a risk measure with VaR and CVaR to derive
optimal asset allocations. They used the momentum strategy by Rachev, Jašić, Stoyanov,
and Fabozzi (2007) to extract views from historical stock price data and showed that the
dynamic Black-Litterman portfolio outperformed the equal weighted portfolio and the
benchmark portfolio. The dynamic Black-Litterman portfolio was also more diversified
than the mean-variance portfolio. Beach and Orlov (2007) derived the views from a fitted
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EGARCH-M model with historical monthly equity return data comprised of two
countries in the MSCI World Index and they showed that the Black-Litterman portfolio
outperformed the market portfolio.
Despite the superior performance of the Black-Litterman model over some other
choices for active asset allocation strategies (Bessler et al., 2017; Gofman & Manela,
2012), this method has not gained popularity among academic researchers. One of the
major reasons is the model’s complexity. Since the introduction of the Black-Litterman
model by Black and Litterman (1992), researchers have made many attempts to expand
this model and provide intuitive interpretation of the parameters used in the model (G. He
& Litterman, 1999; Idzorek, 2002; Lejeune, 2011; Mankert & Seiler, 2011; Meucci,
2010; Michaud, Esch, & Michaud, 2012; Pezier, 2007; Satchell & Scowcroft, 2000;
Schöttle, Werner, & Zagst, 2010). The parameter  in the Black-Litterman model
framework is probably the most puzzling factor. Walters (2013) and Walters (2014)
discussed the calibration of the parameter  in three different Black-Litterman settings. In
the canonical model proposed by G. He and Litterman (1999),  was simply a scaler
divided by the sample size. In a hybrid model introduced by Satchell and Scowcroft
(2000), the authors chose  to be equal to 1. In an alternative model by Meucci (2010), 
became unnecessary because it could be viewed as a shrinkage parameter as specified by
the investors. Satchell and Scowcroft (2000) provided an alternative formulation of the
Black-Litterman model. They treated  as a stochastic parameter and assumed that the
expected return followed a multivariate t-distribution. In addition, most empirical studies
that tested the Black-Litterman model focused on index level trading (Allaj, 2013;
Bessler et al., 2017; Black & Litterman, 1992; Meucci, 2010; Pezier, 2007) rather than
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individual equity level trading. The “views” in the index level trading models were
derived from predictive models (Beach & Orlov, 2007; F. Becker & Gürtler, 2010; Duqi,
Franci, & Torluccio, 2014; Harris et al., 2016; Lai, Xing, & Chen, 2011; Palomba, 2008;
Zhou, 2009) rather than “genuine” human subjective opinions.
Given the deficiency in existing literature, my study fills the gap between
technical discussions of the Black-Litterman model and the applications to address
research questions regarding financial analysts’ recommendations in a real business
setting.

4.2 Data
In this study, I use the data of financial analysts’ recommendations from I/B/E/S
database and the historical stock price data from CRSP database. I only consider the US
stocks covered by US analysts, from 1-Jan-2005 to 31-Dec-2015 to avoid the regulatory
impact as discussed in Chapter 3. Like the analysis in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I exclude
stocks that have missing records for the historical stock price information during the
examination period and I only focus on the top 300 stocks that receive most frequent
recommendation updates. In deriving analysts’ views on the recommended stocks, I use
analysts’ target price estimates from the I/B/E/S database. If the date of an analyst’s
target price estimate is issued within a [-1, +1] trading day window of a recommendation
announcement, I associate that target price estimate with the recommendation and use it
to calculate the analysts’ view on the stock price movement. My final sample data for the
portfolio construction analysis contains 63,205 recommendations issued by 4,959
individual analysts.
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Table 4.1 presents the distribution of the 300 stocks in the analysis. Panel A
presents the distribution across different industrial sectors. The first two digits of the SIC
code is used to identify the stocks’ industrial sector. The manufacturing industry received
the highest attention by the financial analysts (about 36% of recommendations are issued
in this sector), followed by the finance sector, service sector and mining sector which
comprise 44% of the total recommendations with approximately equal weights for each
sector. About 57.46% of the recommendations were issued with a target price estimate.
The distribution of the top 300 most recommended stocks across the industrial sector
does not deviate much from the industrial distribution of the S&P 500 index, which
indicates that the sample data provides a good proxy for the market portfolio. Panel B
presents the recommendation distribution across different levels of market capitalization.
More than 88% of the recommendations in the data sample are issued to stocks in the
category of Big/Large Capitalization ($10B-$200B) and Mid Capitalization ($2B-$10B).
The proportion of the recommendations with a target price remains relatively stable
across industrial sectors and categories of market capitalization. The only obvious
exceptions are found in the mining sector where the proportion of target-price
recommendations is highest (up to 60%), and the Micro/Nano Capitalization stocks
(lowest proportion of 48%). This finding is consistent with the fact that analysts tend to
skip issuing a target price for small-capital stocks due to the lack of information.
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Table 4.1 Distribution of Recommended Stocks
Panel A: Distribution by Industrial Sector
Divisions
Manufacturing
Finance, Real Estate
Service
Mining
Retail
Transportation, Utility
Construction
Total

# Recommendations
(with Target Price)
13,064
5,146
5,542
5,746
3,770
2,554
498
36,320

#
Recommendations
(without Target
Price)
10,093
3,848
3,894
3,751
2,918
1,970
411
26,885

#
Recommendations
(Total)
23,157
8,994
9,436
9,497
6,688
4,524
909
63,205

Panel B: Distribution by Market Capitalization
Market Capitalization
1.Mega Cap (>$200B)
2.Big/Large Cap ($10B-$200B)
3.Mid Cap ($2B-$10B)
4.Small Cap ($30M-$2B)
5.Micro/Nano Cap (<$30M)
Total

#
Recommendations
(with Target
Price)
704
19,109
13,198
3,207
102
36,320

#
Recommendations
(without Target
Price)
533
13,977
9,672
2,594
109
26,885

#
Recommendations
(Total)
1,237
33,086
22,870
5,801
211
63,205

Notes: This table presents the distribution of top 300 mostly recommended stocks by the industrial sectors
(Panel A) and Market Capitalization (Panel B). The industrial sector is determined by the first 2-digit SIC
code in the CRSP database.

Table 4.2 presents the distribution of analysts’ recommendations by
recommendation ratings on a yearly basis. As we can see, recommendations are evenly
distributed across each year, indicating that missing data for a certain year or a structural
break of the recommendation distribution should be of minor concern. Existing literature
finds that the regulations around the year 2002 had an impact changing the distribution of
recommendation ratings (B. M. Barber et al., 2006; Chan et al., 2014; C.-Y. Chen &
Chen, 2013). However, my sample starts from the year of 2005 and there are no
significant changes in the recommendation distributions. A cross examination between
the proportion of recommendations with target prices and the recommendation rating
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levels reveals that analysts are more willing to use target price estimates to support
“Strong Buy” and “Buy” recommendations and tend to avoid providing target price
estimates for ‘Hold’ recommendations. This finding is consistent with the fact that
“Hold” ratings are the most ambiguous signals regarding the investment decision and
analysts are less confident in issuing a clear target price estimate for a “Hold” rating. The
proportion of target price estimates for “Strong Sell” recommendations is also low, which
can be explained by the fact that if analysts perceive the underlying stocks to be
extremely unprofitable, they reduce their effort in following the stocks and reduce the
information that they provide in their research report (K. K. Li & You, 2015).
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Table 4.2 Distribution of Analysts’ Recommendations Ratings
Year
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Overall

Strong Buy
Target %
Overall %
61.52
20.50
59.34
16.38
54.39
17.27
51.39
18.48
67.24
18.65
66.16
20.21
61.34
18.91
61.36
14.41
72.72
15.18
72.65
14.54
73.63
14.22
62.82

17.35

Buy
Target %
Overall %
62.18
27.25
58.05
27.77
61.44
27.74
63.83
23.53
76.29
25.40
70.76
28.81
64.28
31.58
60.32
28.70
77.58
30.33
73.00
32.94
76.28
29.56
67.52

28.29

Hold
Target %
Overall %
38.28
43.24
36.39
44.92
42.19
44.99
49.32
45.12
51.25
43.41
49.36
42.71
50.79
41.03
48.56
47.33
57.03
44.38
58.68
44.19
61.21
45.59
49.13

44.20

Sell
Target %
Overall %
44.97
6.60
45.13
7.24
49.73
6.63
67.70
8.09
65.29
8.45
56.96
6.16
54.92
6.60
48.27
7.79
70.00
7.93
68.87
6.46
73.53
8.35
59.08

7.32

Strong Sell
Target %
Overall %
50.00
2.42
52.26
3.69
35.42
3.38
30.32
4.77
47.16
4.09
58.02
2.12
52.00
1.89
70.48
1.77
70.00
2.18
77.27
1.88
69.61
2.28
50.08

2.85

Total #
5,123
5,390
5,675
7,190
6,890
6,186
6,622
5,927
5,045
4,678
4,479
63,205

Notes: This table presents the distribution of analysts’ recommendations on a yearly basis. For each rating level, the first column is the count of recommendations
with a target price divided by the count of recommendations at the same rating level; the second column is the count of recommendations at the same rating level
divided by the total recommendations for that year.
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B. M. Barber et al. (2010) indicate that the information of recommendation rating
change is more valuable than the pure rating alone. The examination of the
recommendation distribution by revision is presented in Table 4.3. As indicated by the
statistical summary, analysts tend to issue a target price estimate to support an upgrade
action and skip a target price when issuing a downgrade. This finding is consistent with
the explanation for the low proportion of target prices for “Strong Sell”
recommendations, in which the analysts produce less information when they perceive an
underperformance of the recommended stock. It is also interesting to notice that the
proportion of reiterations is higher for recommendations without a target price. Existing
literature shows that analysts’ reiterations of the same rating produce little value to
investors (Asquith et al., 2005; Francis & Soffer, 1997). In the cross examination
between the target price and revisions, the insignificant market reactions to the
reiterations may be attributed to a less research effort by the analysts’ in a reiteration,
thus diminishing the credibility of the recommendation.
To summarize the sample data used in this paper, the top 300 most recommended
stocks provide a good proxy for the market portfolio and the recommendations show a
distribution that is consistent with findings documented in previous studies thus
alleviating concern of selection bias.

70

Table 4.3 Distribution of Recommendations Revisions (%)
Panel A: Distribution of Revision (All Recommendations), in %
To Rating
From Rating
Strong Buy
Buy
Hold
None
4.11
6.37
9.36
Strong Buy
2.34
2.63
8.08
Buy
2.53
6.35
12.1
Hold
7.97
12.25
8.82
Sell
0.2
0.62
4
Strong Sell
0.21
0.07
1.83
Total
17.35
28.29
44.2
Upgrade
29.92
New Initiation
Downgrade
29.72
Reiteration

Sell
1.38
0.2
0.62
3.85
1.01
0.24
7.32
21.63
18.72

Strong Sell
0.41
0.19
0.08
1.76
0.21
0.2
2.85

Panel B: Distribution of Revision (Recommendations with Target Price), in %
To Rating
From Rating
Strong Buy
Buy
Hold
Sell
Strong Sell
None
5.03
8.48
9.56
1.67
0.51
Strong Buy
2.05
2.6
5.8
0.27
0.22
Buy
2.4
5.43
11.13
0.73
0.11
Hold
9.01
15.81
6.14
3.97
1.4
Sell
0.27
0.83
3.85
0.69
0.12
Strong Sell
0.22
0.09
1.3
0.19
0.13
Total
18.97
33.24
37.79
7.52
2.48
Upgrade
33.97
New Initiation 25.25
Downgrade
26.35
Reiteration 14.44

Panel C: Distribution of Revision (Recommendations without Target Price), in %
To Rating
From Rating
Strong Buy
Buy
Hold
Sell
Strong Sell
None
2.86
3.51
9.08
1
0.28
Strong Buy
2.73
2.68
11.17
0.1
0.15
Buy
2.72
7.6
13.41
0.48
0.04
Hold
6.56
7.44
12.44
3.69
2.26
Sell
0.1
0.34
4.21
1.45
0.33
Strong Sell
0.19
0.03
2.54
0.31
0.29
Total
15.16
21.6
52.86
7.04
3.34
Upgrade
24.44
New Initiation 16.73
Downgrade
34.31
Reiteration 24.51

Total
21.63
13.45
21.69
34.65
6.04
2.54
100

Total
25.26
10.93
19.8
36.32
5.75
1.93
100

Total
16.73
16.84
24.25
32.39
6.43
3.37
100

Notes: This table shows the distribution of revisions. Panel A summarizes the distribution across all the
sample recommendations. Panel B and Panel C uses recommendations with target prices and without target
prices respectively. The first row of each table presents the initiation of a new rating (no prior rating issued
by the same analyst).
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4.3 Research Method
In this section, I present the portfolio construction methods to implement the
recommendation-based trading strategies. There are three major portfolio constructions
employed in this paper, the passive strategy, the enhance management strategy and the
active asset allocation strategy. All three portfolios are rebalanced on a weekly basis. The
strategies assume that investors observe the recommendations issued by analysts during
the weekdays of the week and reconcile the information to make investment decision at
the end of the week.

4.3.1 Passive Portfolio Strategy
The passive portfolios contain both a long-only strategy and a long/short trading
strategy. Investors make the decision on whether they should long the stocks based on
whether the stocks receive a “Long” signal from the analysts’ recommendations during
the current week. The “Long” signal consists of two situations: one situation is that a
stock receives more favorable recommendations than unfavorable recommendations
during the week; the other situation is when the numbers of favorable and unfavorable
recommendations are equal and the consensus rating is between 1 (Strong Buy) and 2.5
(in-between Buy and Hold). B. M. Barber et al. (2010) pointed out that the change of
recommendation rating generates stronger market reactions than the level of
recommendation rating, therefore both the rating and change of rating are considered in
the definition of which recommendations are favorable/unfavorable. The favorable
recommendations contain initiations of new “Strong Buy/Buy”, reiterations of “Strong
Buy/Buy” and any upgrades, while the other recommendations are treated as unfavorable
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recommendations. Four passive portfolios are constructed. Two portfolios are constructed
using a long-only strategy where one portfolio uses all the available recommendations in
the data sample and the other portfolio uses only the recommendations with a target price
estimate. The other two portfolios are constructed using a long/short strategy where the
short position refers to short selling stocks that do not receive a “Long” signal, i.e.
downgrades and new initiations and reiterations of “Hold/Sell/Strong Sell”. I also create
two long/short portfolios that are based on different sources of recommendations (with
target price vs. without target price). The weight of the stocks in the portfolio (both long
and short position) are in proportion to the stock market capitalization value at the end of
the weekend. Some investment companies have restrictions on the short positions. In this
study, I assume a 130% long vs. 30% short weight to form the long-short passive
portfolio.

4.3.2 Enhanced Portfolio Management Strategy
The second portfolio construction in this study is an enhanced portfolio
management strategy, in which the stock selection is based on analysts’ recommendations
and the weight of the stock is determined by the traditional mean-variance optimization
procedure.(Kroll, Levy, & Markowitz, 1984; H. Markowitz, 1952; H. M. Markowitz,
1989). Similar to the long-only passive portfolio strategy, this enhanced portfolio takes
long positions for stocks with “Long” signals. However, instead of using market
capitalization weight to rebalance the stock holdings, this strategy calculates the optimal
weights of the stocks from a mean-variance optimization based on the historical stock
return.
The procedure of the enhanced portfolio construction is detailed as below:
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1) At the end of each week, investors determine which stocks to buy or to sell
based on the recommendations issued during that week. Stocks receiving a
“Long” signal as defined in the passive portfolio strategy will be included in
the investment pool, otherwise they will be excluded from the investment
pool.
2) The expected weekly rate of return for the stocks  and the variancecovariance of the weekly return  for stocks in the investment pool are
calculated from the all the historical data up to the current week.
3) The weight of the stocks in the portfolio is determined by the following
optimization problem:
   =

 
 

. ∑  =  ¡ ¢ ≤  ≤ 

(4.1)
(4.2)

where ¤ is the weight of the stocks in the portfolio and /0 is the weekly riskfree rate of return obtained from the Fama-French research factors. Equation
(4.1) states that the goal of the optimization is to maximize the Sharpe ratio of
the portfolio and the optimization constraint in Equation (4.2) states that this
portfolio takes long-only positions and the weights sum to 1.
Without the long-only constructions in Equation (4.2), the optimal portfolio is a
tangent portfolio and the corresponding weights ¤I¥ can be determined analytically
using the following formula (Jobson & Korkie, 1982):
¤Rz" =

− 
′ ¦−1 §
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(4.3)

Given the long-only constraint, the optimal weight ∗ for this optimization
problem can only be solved numerically through quadratic programming (Elton, Gruber,
& Padberg, 1976; Tutuncu & Cornuejols, 2007). Investors use ∗, to rebalance the
portfolio at the end of each week t and realize a portfolio return ¥,5 =
-∗, 2

¨



in the next week, where



is the vector of realized returns in week t+1

for the stocks in the investment pool.

4.3.3 Active Portfolio Approach and Black-Litterman Model Specification
The portfolio construction for the active portfolio strategy derives the optimal
stock weights from the Black-Litterman framework. Compared with the enhanced
portfolio management strategy, the Black-Litterman model addresses several practical
deficiencies in the mean-variance optimization model proposed by H. Markowitz (1952).
One critical issue in the Markowitz (1952)’ mean-variance framework is that portfolio
weight is extremely sensitive to the input parameter . Chopra and Ziemba (2011)
pointed out that the mean-variance optimization framework contained the issue of error
maximizing which led to a hypersensitivity to the input parameter. Meucci (2009) also
demonstrated that the sample mean is not a reliable estimator for the portfolio
optimization problem. To address this issue, the Black-Litterman model (Black &
Litterman, 1992) utilizes the reverse-optimization procedure to extract the market implied
rate of return rather than using the historical return estimate. This reverse-optimization
starts with the market portfolio as a benchmark and assumes that the market-capital
weights of the assets in the benchmark is the result of a portfolio optimizor with an
“equilibrium-expected return” (denoted as Π ). In other words, the returns obtained from
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the reverse-optimization procedure simply assume that the capitalization-weighted
benchmark is already an optimized efficient portfolio. In this reverse-optimization, the
implied returns ª for all the stocks in the investment pool are calculated as follows:
« = ¬¦¤

(4.4)

where Π is the vector representing the equilibrium implied excess return, ¬ is a scalar
representing the risk-aversion coefficient, Σ is the covariance matrix of the all the stocks
in the investment pool and ¤ is the market capitalization weight of stocks in the
investment pool. In the original version of the Black-Litterman model, Σ is assumed to be
constant as the portfolio optimization procedure is less sensitive to the covariance
estimate. This equilibrium implied return is essentially the solution to the following
unconstrained return maximization problem:
¬

8®¯¯_{¤ : ¤′ « − 2 ¤′ ¦ ¤ (4.5)
In this paper, Σ is chosen to be a constant covariance matrix as estimated from the
complete historical time-series of weekly return data. The risk aversion coefficient ¬
measures how an investor is willing to take one unit of risk in exchange for the potential
5

return that maximizes the quadratic utility function ± = ¤ ¨ () − 6 ¬¤ ¨ Σ¤. Some
researchers (Best & Grauer, 1991; Gridold & Kahn, 1999) suggested the risk aversion
coefficient can be calibrated through the performance of the market portfolio,
¬=

²(T³ )T´

(4.6)

E
µ³

In this study, I change the value ¬ from 1 to 9 to test the robustness of the BlackLitterman model and the portfolio sensitivity to the choice of ¬.
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Another major issue regarding the traditional mean-variance portfolio
optimization is that the model doesn’t allow for the inclusion of private information. The
Black-Litterman model nicely addresses this issue by using a Bayesian framework to
combine the market implied return with investor’s subjective views. Black-Litterman
allows both absolute and relative views, i.e. fixed expected rate of return for each stock or
one stock outperforming another stock. The views in the Black-Litterman model are
described in the following equation:
y§ = ¶ −

(4.7)

where y is a ! × v matrix representing k views on n assets, ¶ is a k-vector representing
the expected excess return of each view and

is a random error following ^(0, Ω), where

Ω is the uncertainty matrix of the views. To illustrate the implementation of the view
matrix, assume that an analyst thinks asset A will achieve a 3% excess return and asset B
will achieve 4% excess return for a 3-asset investment pool, then the view Matrix can be
described in the following P and Q
1 0 0
y=V
Z
0 1 0

(4.8)

3%
Z
4%

(4.9)

¶=V

In this study, analysts’ views are primarily derived from the stock target price
estimate associated with the recommendations. Similar to the method adopted by L. Chen
et al. (2015), the views regarding the absolute rate of return is translated from the target
price by the following equation:
1

/¯ =

4ℎ
y
n y{B",¯s
0,¯

(4.10)
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where /¼ is the view of the expected weekly rate of return for stock i, yk,¼ is the target
price estimate for stock i, yd,¼ is the price of stock i at the recommendation announcement
date and h is the forecasting horizon (expressed by month). The average of the
outstanding individual recommendation views in week t is calculated to denote the view
on stock i for that week. For the recommendations without a target price estimate, a
“bootstrap” is applied to derive the views for the non-price-target recommendations. A
recommendation without a target price will be assigned with the view which is equal to
the expected weekly return of the most recent similar recommendation with a target price.
For example, suppose analyst A issues a “Buy” recommendation with a target price on a
certain stock s which can be translated as an expected weekly rate of return 2% and
analyst B also issues a following “Buy” recommendation on the same stock without a
target price. Then the “Buy” recommendation issued by analyst B will be treated as
having a view of weekly expected return at 2% as well. The rationale of taking this
“bootstrap” approach assumes that some analysts may lack the private information to
generate reliable target price estimates. However, once they observe the information of a
target price generated by other analysts, they might have the ability to identify the most
accurate analysts and follow their opinions. If analysts can pick up top analysts, then the
views with most accurate estimates will also have a higher proportion in the aggregated
views thus enhancing the quality of the view. For weeks when no new recommendations
or target price estimates are issued, the most recent views on the underlying stock will be
assumed to continue. Based on these assumptions, the P matrix in this research study is a
300 × 300 identity matrix and the Q matrix is a time-varying 300 × 1 vector.
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½ by combining the
Then I derive the posterior distribution of the excess return Π
market implied equilibrium return Π and analysts’ view P by using the following
equations based on the Black-Litterman Model:
½ ) = [(¦)5 + y¨ ¿ 5 y]5 [(¦)5 « + y¨ ¿ 5 ¶]
(«
½ 2 = [(¦)5 + y¨ ¿ 5 y]5
C/-«

(4.11)
(4.12)

As indicated by the literature review, the uncertainty matrix Ω and scaling factor 
are the most puzzling parameters in the Black-Litterman model (Allaj, 2013; Walters,
2013). The uncertainty matrix Ω is derived through the method proposed by Idzorek
(2002) in the following equation
¿ =  y¨ ¦y

(4.13)

One advantage of using Equation (4.13) to calculate Ω is that the posterior
½ ) will no longer be dependent on the choice of , although 
expected excess return (Π
still affects the covariance matrix of the posterior return. Once the revised expected stock
returns are calculated, the optimal weights for each stock in the portfolio are derived
based on the following optimization problem:
¬

½ − ¤′ ¦ ¤
8®¯¯_{¤ : ¤′ «
2

(4.14)

with the constraint that ¤ ¨  = 1.
The optimization problem in Equation (4.14) can be easily solved through a
quadratic optimization procedure and the optimized portfolio is dependent on the choice
of risk aversion coefficient ¬. Without the constraint of ¤ ¨ > 0, the Black-Litterman
portfolio can take short selling positions on stocks that are perceived to be
underperforming.
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4.3.4 Performance Evaluation and Attribution Analysis
I use two main performance measurements to evaluate the profitability of the
different strategies: abnormal return and Sharpe Ratio. The abnormal return performance
is calculated as the intercept from the 3 factor model developed by Fama and French
(1993) by estimating the following weekly time-series regression model for each
portfolio j.
Â

/¥, − /0, = 3 Â + ' Â -/., − /0, 2 + B Â 78 + ℎ Â 8: +

Â


(4.15)

Â

where /¥, is the weekly rate of return for portfolio j on week t, /0, is the risk-free rate of
return on week t, /., is the return on the value-weighted market index, 78 is the size
factor on week t, which equals the return on a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks
minus the return on a value-weighted portfolio of large capital stocks and 8: is the
book-to-market factor on week t, which equals the return on a value-weighted portfolio of
high book-to-market stocks minus the return on a value-weighted portfolio of low bookto-market stocks. The intercept term 3 Â is the abnormal return on portfolio j.
The other performance measurement, Sharpe Ratio, considers the excess return
adjusted by the total risk. Equation (4.16) presents the formula for calculating the Sharpe
Ratio.
7ℎ/z{ "¯R Â =

Ã

²(<c <´ )
µ Ã
Ä

(4.16)

c

Â

where (/¥ − /0 ) is the expected weekly excess return for the portfolio and Å< Ã is the
c

standard deviation for the weekly excess return for the portfolio.
In the active portfolio, analysts’ recommendations provide information that allows
investors to underweight/overweight certain industrial sectors in the portfolio. The
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deviation from the benchmark portfolio composition is accompanied by an active
portfolio return. Brinson and Fachler (1985) proposed a model that described the
attributions of the portfolio active returns from three categories: an asset allocation effect,
an asset selection effect and an interaction effect, which are defined in the following
equations:
%
i
i
− ¤¼,
2 × -/¼,
− /i 2
¼, = -¤¼,
i
%
i
7¼, = ¤¼,
× -/¼,
− /¼,
2
%
i
%
i
¼, = (¤¼,
− ¤¼,
) × -/¼,
− /¼,
2

(4.17)
(4.18)
(4.19)

where ¼, , 7¼, and ¼, are the asset allocation effect, selection effect and interaction
%
i
effect on sector i at period t respectively; ¤¼,
and ¤¼,
are the asset weights in sector i at
%
i
period t for the active portfolio and benchmark portfolio; /¼,
and /¼,
are the return in

sector i at period t for the active portfolio and benchmark portfolio respectively; and /i
is the total return of the benchmark portfolio at period t. The aggregation of the
attribution effect at period t is simply the summation of ¼, , 7¼, and ¼, over all the
sectors i. Researchers have also proposed other techniques to extend the one-period
attribution analysis into multiple-periods (Carino, 1999; Davies & Laker, 2001;
Frongello, 2002; Menchero, 2000). For the purpose of simplicity, my study adopts the
arithmetic summation over the individual one-period effects in the multiple-period
attribution analysis.
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4.4 Analysis Results and Discussion
4.4.1 Passive Portfolio Strategy and Enhanced Portfolio Strategy Performance
Table 4.4 presents the weekly performance of the passive portfolio strategies for
the period between Jan-1-2005 and Dec-31-2015. Panel A lists the performance of the
benchmark portfolio, which is the value-weighted portfolio consisting of all 300
underlying stocks. All the four passive portfolio strategies (presented in Panel B and
Panel C) outperform both the market portfolio (a value-weight portfolio, which consists
of all the US stocks in the financial market and has a Sharpe Ratio of 0.022) and the
benchmark portfolio (presented in Panel A) in terms of a larger Sharpe Ratio and higher
abnormal return. This finding confirms that analysts’ recommendations contain
investment value that can be captured by a passive portfolio strategy. Portfolios that use
only the recommendations with a target price estimate generate a higher Sharpe Ratio and
higher abnormal returns than portfolios that use all recommendations. This suggests that
recommendations without a clear target price estimate create noisy signals and impair the
profitability of the strategy. Based on the recommendations with target price, the longshort passive strategy generates higher weekly abnormal returns and a higher Sharpe ratio
than the long-only strategy, which shows the incremental value of taking the short-selling
positions. Based on all the recommendations, the abnormal return for the long-short
portfolio is not significantly different from zero, which confirms that recommendations
without target price information do not generate investment value.
Table 4.4 Portfolio Performance Evaluation (Passive Strategies)
Panel A: Benchmark Portfolio (Passively Holding All 300 Stocks)
Sharpe Ratio
Abnormal Return
0.079
0.063%**
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Panel B: Long-Only Passive Portfolio Strategy
(Only Follow Recommendations w. Target Price)
Sharpe Ratio
Abnormal Return
0.083
0.079%**
(Follow All Recommendations)
Sharpe Ratio
Abnormal Return
0.082
0.077%*

Panel C: Long-Short (130-30) Passive Portfolio Strategy
(Only Follow Recommendations w. Target Price)
Sharpe Ratio
Abnormal Return
0.085
0.089%*
(Follow All Recommendations)
Sharpe Ratio
Abnormal Return
0.082
0.085%
Note: This table presents the weekly abnormal return and Sharpe Ratio for the passive portfolios consisting
of the top 300 mostly recommended stocks. Panel A presents the portfolio performance for the benchmark
portfolio, which assumes investor use the market capitalization weight to passively hold all the 300 stocks
without regard to analysts’ recommendations. Panel B presents the performance of long-only passive
portfolio strategy which only invests in stocks with “Buy” signals. Panel C presents the performance of the
long-short passive portfolio strategy, which takes 130% long position on stocks with “Buy” signals and
30% short position on stocks without “Buy” signals. The trading signals are constructed from both the
recommendation rating and revision.
The weights of the stocks are in proportion to the market capitalization of the underlying stocks.
***, **, * denotes the statistical significance for a two-tailed test at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively.

Table 4.5 presents the portfolio performance for an enhanced management
strategy. Surprisingly, the enhanced portfolio exhibits an inferior performance to the
passive portfolio strategies in terms of both a lower Sharpe Ratio and a lower and
insignificant abnormal return. Since I use the average of historical stock returns as the
input to obtain the portfolio optimization, the results just confirm that the error
maximizing nature of the mean-variance optimization leads to a poor performance.
Table 4.5 Portfolio Performance Evaluation (Enhanced Management Strategy)
Enhanced Portfolio Management Strategy
(Long-only)
Sharpe Ratio
Abnormal Return
0.071
0.03%
Note: This table presents the weekly abnormal return and Sharpe Ratio for the enhanced portfolio
consisting of the top 300 mostly recommended stocks. The portfolios are constructed based on the trading
signal from analysts’ recommendations and are rebalanced using a mean-variance optimization procedure.
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The weekly abnormal return for the portfolio is 0.03% and is not significantly different from 0 at the 10%
level.

4.4.2 Active Portfolio Strategy Performance
Table 4.6 presents the portfolio performance for an active trading strategy using
the Black-Litterman model. Since the choice of parameter  in my study does not affect
the expected stocks’ posterior return and my study assumes constant variance, the
portfolio weight will only be subjected to the parameter of risk aversion coefficient ¬. I
test different choices for ¬ between 1 and 8 and evaluate the abnormal return and Sharpe
Ratio for the corresponding portfolios respectively. Like the passive portfolio
construction, the Black-Litterman portfolio is also formulated through 1) using only the
recommendations with target price estimates 2) using all the available recommendations
but with bootstrapped target prices where required
Table 4.6 Portfolio Performance Evaluation (Black-Litterman Model)

Æ
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Black Litterman Portfolio
(Follow Recommendations w. Target Price)
Sharpe Ratio
Abnormal Return
0.01
0.48%
0.08
3.6%*
0.14
4.1%***
0.08
2.52%*
0.09
7.1%**
0.19
4.26%***
0.22
3.94%***
0.11
6.02%**

Black Litterman Portfolio
(Follow All Recommendations)
Sharpe Ratio
Abnormal Return
0.04
2.04%
-0.01
-0.82%
-0.01
-3.21%
-0.01
-3.99%
0
-0.53%
0.06
18.45%
0.1
7.49%**
0.12
3.97%***

Note: This table presents the weekly abnormal return and Sharpe Ratio for the active portfolio strategy
adopting the Black-Litterman model with the top 300 most recommended stocks. The analysts’ views are
extracted from the information of analysts’ target price. For recommendations without a target price, the
views are bootstrapped by the most recent recommendation at the same rating level with a target price.

The left panel of the Table 4.6 shows the portfolio performance of the BlackLitterman strategy using only the recommendations with target price estimates. This
strategy generates consistent positive profit as both the abnormal return and Sharpe Ratio
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are positive for all tested levels of ¬. The results also indicate that the Black-Litterman
portfolio performance is sensitive to the choice of risk aversion coefficient. At a low level
of risk aversion, the abnormal return is not statistically significant, while at a high level
of risk aversion, the abnormal return tends to be more stable and becomes significantly
greater than zero. This finding makes sense from an economic perspective. The BlackLitterman model introduces extra uncertainty regarding analysts’ opinion, therefore
setting a higher level of trade-off between reward and risk in the portfolio optimization
corrects for those excess risks and improves the portfolio performance. For the riskaversion coefficient beyond 2.0, the Black-Litterman model consistently achieves a
positive weekly abnormal return above 2%, which is much greater than the 0.09%
abnormal return for the passive portfolio. This finding indicates that there is significant
incremental investment value in switching from a passively managed portfolio strategy to
an actively managed strategy. In the examination of the Sharpe Ratio, all the BlackLitterman portfolios achieve a Sharpe Ratio above 0.1, while the passive portfolio
strategy yields a Sharpe Ratio of 0.09. Both performance measures confirm that the
investment value of analysts’ recommendations with target price estimates can be more
effectively exploited through a Black-Litterman portfolio instead of a passive portfolio
strategy.
The right panel shows the results of the Black-Litterman portfolio using all
recommendations, where the non-target-price recommendations are bootstrapped with the
most recent similar recommendations with target price estimates. Only portfolios that are
constructed with extremely high risk-aversion coefficients (¬ = 7, 8) achieve significant
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positive abnormal return and positive Sharpe Ratio. For risk-aversion coefficient below 6,
the abnormal return is not significantly different from zero.
The results contain several important implications. First, setting a high riskaversion coefficient improves the quality of the portfolio performance for the BlackLitterman strategy. No matter whether the Black-Litterman model uses views from
recommendations with a target price or from recommendations without a target price, the
performance tends to be more stable at higher risk aversive levels. Existing literature
suggested using the market portfolio to calibrate the risk aversion coefficient (Best &
Grauer, 1991; Gridold & Kahn, 1999). Applying Equation (4.6) with the historical
weekly rate of return data from the value-weighted market index, the risk aversion
coefficient is only 0.02. The robustness check of the Black-Litterman model in this
analysis does not support this choice and suggests a risk aversion coefficient above 7 to
produce more satisfying portfolio results. Second, the quality of the recommendations
determines the success of the strategy. Recommendations without target price estimates
may fail to provide incremental investment value. In the passive portfolio strategies,
trading signals comprising all the available recommendations still generate positive
abnormal returns. When it comes to the active strategy that requires a specific numeric
view input, the “bootstrapped” views from the non-target-price recommendations
significantly reduce the portfolio performance. There are several reasons that can be
attributed to the underperformance of the “bootstrapped” views. First, recommendations
without a target price may themselves be less reliable. Analysts may not put as much
effort in developing the recommendations without target price estimates, thus leading the
recommendations to be less informative and of less investment value. Second,
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“bootstrapped” views may less accurately reflect the true thought of the analysts, thus
leading to a poor estimate of the view matrix. Last, the “Bootstrap” of the views assumes
that analysts can identify top analysts, thus increasing the chance of getting reliable
aggregated views. This assumption may be invalid. If analysts do not have the ability to
produce target price estimates in their recommendations, they may also not have the
capability to identify top analysts who can produce accurate target prices. Therefore, the
non-target-price recommendations may reflect analysts’ blind herding behavior, which
could impair the functionality of price discovery in their issued recommendations.

4.4.3 Investment Value Attributions
This section presents the performance attribution analysis for the portfolio
strategies. Based on the results of the portfolio evaluation, I only consider the investment
value attribution analysis for portfolios created based on the recommendations with target
prices.
Table 4.7 presents the results of attribution analysis for the long-only passive
portfolio strategy. The table shows that following analysts’ recommendations with a no
short-selling constraint generates a cumulative 8.3% active return over the benchmark
portfolio during the 11-year sample period. The major contribution of this active return is
due to the selection effect and both the asset allocation effect and the interactive effect
are negative. This finding implies that the long-only passive trading is better at capturing
under-valued stocks rather than identifying profitable industries. Panel A shows the
performance attribution across multiple-periods and the results indicate that this strategy
generates negative active returns during the financial crisis period (year 2007-2009).
Panel B presents the attribution across each industrial sector and the results demonstrate
87

that analysts are better at identifying under-valued stocks in the manufacturing sector and
finance sector. The manufacturing sector is also the sector that received the most
recommendations in our sample data. This finding is consistent with the selection
hypothesis by McNichols and O'Brien (1997), which states that analysts tend to cover
stocks that for which they have positive views.
Table 4.7 Portfolio Performance Attribution (Long-only Passive Portfolio Strategy)
Panel A: Performance Attribution by Different Periods
Year
Allocation
Selection
2005
0.51%
-1.63%
2006
0.70%
-2.82%
2007
-0.90%
4.16%
2008
-0.62%
-6.93%
2009
-2.18%
-3.19%
2010
-0.72%
-1.65%
2011
-2.03%
8.96%
2012
0.38%
2.34%
2013
0.17%
3.71%
2014
0.42%
6.41%
2015
0.75%
4.59%
OVERALL

-3.52%

13.95%

Panel B: Performance Attribution by Industrial Sectors
Division
Allocation
Selection
Construction
0.11%
-0.12%
Finance, Real Estate
-4.29%
6.61%
Manufacturing
-0.11%
6.97%
Mining
-0.18%
1.85%
Retail
-1.88%
1.11%
Service
2.75%
-2.75%
Transportation, Utility
0.08%
0.28%
OVERALL

-3.52%

13.95%

Interaction
-0.23%
0.43%
-0.16%
0.96%
-1.38%
0.07%
-0.67%
0.01%
-0.44%
-1.01%
0.29%

OVERALL
-1.35%
-1.69%
3.09%
-6.59%
-6.74%
-2.31%
6.26%
2.73%
3.44%
5.82%
5.64%

-2.14%

8.30%

Interaction
0.05%
-0.17%
-1.29%
-0.31%
-0.65%
0.11%
0.13%

OVERALL
0.04%
2.15%
5.56%
1.35%
-1.42%
0.12%
0.49%

-2.14%

8.30%

Notes: This table presents the performance attribution for the long-only passive portfolio strategy. Trading
signals are obtained based on analysts’ recommendations with a target price. The benchmark portfolio is
constructed based on the top 300 most recommended stocks using a market value-weight for rebalancing.
This strategy yields a cumulative 8.3% active return, which is equivalent to an annual outperformance of
0.7% over the benchmark portfolio.

Table 4.8 Portfolio Performance Attribution (Long-Short 130-30 Passive Portfolio
Strategy)
Panel A: Performance Attribution by Different Periods
Year
Allocation
Selection
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Interaction

OVERALL

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

380.43%
255.35%
-322.57%
-1501.28%
1394.36%
382.90%
-1360.38%
-123.98%
787.97%
437.94%
-470.62%

4.32%
1.38%
-6.01%
-16.61%
22.31%
7.18%
-17.29%
-1.44%
7.77%
6.44%
-7.31%

190.99%
136.98%
-458.83%
-1334.35%
1615.05%
522.01%
-1083.37%
-33.23%
763.17%
325.30%
-421.50%

575.74%
393.71%
-787.41%
-2852.24%
3031.72%
912.09%
-2461.04%
-158.65%
1558.91%
769.68%
-899.43%

OVERALL

-139.89%

0.74%

222.22%

83.07%

Interaction
-0.53%
-116.98%
530.83%
-72.83%
33.05%
-249.54%
98.23%

OVERALL
-0.62%
-186.21%
466.43%
-183.83%
-48.53%
-56.82%
92.66%

222.22%

83.07%

Panel B: Performance Attribution by Industrial Sectors
Division
Allocation
Selection
Construction
-0.03%
-0.06%
Finance, Real Estate
-63.68%
-5.55%
Manufacturing
-73.53%
9.13%
Mining
-109.24%
-1.76%
Retail
-82.36%
0.78%
Service
194.95%
-2.24%
Transportation, Utility
-6.01%
0.44%
OVERALL

-139.89%

0.74%

Notes: This table presents the performance attribution for the long-short passive portfolio strategy with
130% being long position and 30% being short position. Trading signals are obtained based on analysts’
recommendations with a target price. The benchmark portfolio is constructed based on the top 300 most
recommended stocks using a market value-weight for rebalancing. This strategy yields a cumulative
83.07% active return, which is equivalent to an annual outperformance of 5.7% over the benchmark
portfolio.

Table 4.8Table 4.8 displays the attribution of the passive portfolio strategy with
the allowance for 30% short positions. The inclusion of the short position improves the
flexibility of asset allocation, thus increasing the active return. Over the 11-year sample
period, the long/short passive portfolio achieves a cumulative active return of 83.07%
over the benchmark. It is interesting to note that while the asset allocation effect is still
negative, the selection effect significantly decreases, and the interaction effect increases.
This finding implies that analysts’ unfavorable recommendations, which are assumed to
identify over-valued stocks, enhance the profitability only through an under-weighting of
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the underperforming sectors rather than increasing the sector return. The long-short
passive strategy also demonstrates that negative active returns are found during the early
financial crisis period (2007-2008), however the strategy soon captures the profitability in
the late crisis period (2009). The manufacturing sector is still where analysts’
recommendations produce the highest active return.

Table 4.9 Portfolio Performance Attribution (Active Portfolio Strategy with BlackLitterman Approach)
Panel A: Performance Attribution by Different Periods
Year
Allocation
Selection
2005
-147.23%
243.95%
2006
336.45%
-134.65%
2007
2010.04%
-1882.93%
2008
-177.01%
434.26%
2009
-123.42%
142.98%
2010
-356.77%
434.66%
2011
-317.87%
452.84%
2012
-421.82%
453.08%
2013
136.61%
-6.77%
2014
1244.37%
-178.48%
2015
437.87%
-184.43%

Interaction
-132.63%
383.76%
2037.60%
-166.80%
-78.75%
-358.51%
-294.49%
-437.34%
144.20%
1217.79%
442.03%

OVERALL
-35.90%
585.55%
2164.71%
90.44%
-59.18%
-280.62%
-159.52%
-406.08%
274.04%
2283.68%
695.47%

-225.50%

2756.87%

5152.59%

Panel B: Performance Attribution by Industrial Sectors
Division
Allocation
Selection
Construction
19.08%
6.55%
Finance, Real Estate
-565.52%
798.36%
Manufacturing
2778.53%
-1767.09%
Mining
-595.36%
658.66%
Retail
-170.76%
446.69%
Service
618.92%
39.25%
Transportation, Utility
536.32%
-407.91%

Interaction
65.51%
-455.61%
2733.75%
-504.34%
-203.70%
561.66%
559.60%

OVERALL
91.14%
-222.76%
3745.19%
-441.05%
72.23%
1219.83%
688.01%

2756.87%

5152.60%

OVERALL

OVERALL

2621.21%

2621.22%

-225.49%

Notes: This table presents the performance attribution for the Black-Litterman active portfolio strategy. The
view input in the Black-Litterman model is obtained from the target price estimate in analysts’
recommendations and the parameter of the risk coefficient is 7 and the parameter τ is 1. The benchmark
portfolio is constructed based on the top 300 most recommended stocks using a market value-weight for
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rebalancing. This strategy yields a cumulative 5152% active return, which is equivalent to an annual
outperformance of 43.3% over the benchmark portfolio.

The attribution analysis for the Black-Litterman portfolio is presented in Table
4.9. As the results show, the pattern of the performance attribution between the passive
strategy and the Black-Litterman strategy is very different. The selection effect for the
Black-Litterman approach is negative, while both the asset allocation effect and the
interaction effect are positive and are much larger than those for the corresponding
passive strategy. This finding provides evidence that the superior performance of the
Black-Litterman model can be attributed to the extreme “tilting” in the portfolio design.
The highest Black-Litterman active return is achieved in the year of 2007 and 2014 and
this active return seems to be less likely correlated with the financial/economic situation
as well. Across all the industrial sectors, the manufacturing sector still has the highest
active return, which is consistent with results based on the passive portfolio strategies. It
is also interesting to notice that the service sector also benefits from the Black-Litterman
asset allocation strategy, which is not observed in a passive portfolio strategy.
To summarize the findings from the performance attribution analysis, the
investment value of analysts’ recommendations resides in different attribution categories
across different trading strategies. The long-only passive portfolio uses the most
conservative strategy to determine the asset weights and it achieves the lowest active
return. The active return for this strategy is mainly attributed to the selection effect rather
the asset allocation effect and the interaction effect. After allowing for a 30% short
position on stocks with “Sell” signals, the active return of the portfolio increases as
trading flexibility improves. The increased active return is mainly due to the interaction
effect, which refers to investor’s ability to underweight sectors with underperformance.
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In the unconstrained active portfolio built from the Black-Litterman framework, the
strategy achieves the highest active return due to its extreme portfolio tilting. As the
result of the tilting, the active return is mainly attributed to the asset allocation effect and
the interaction effect rather than the selection effect. These findings confirm that there is
marginal benefit in switching from a passive portfolio strategy to an active asset
allocation strategy. If the return estimate in analysts’ recommendations is valid, investors
should be able to exploit an incremental investment value through overweighting sectors
with promising prospects and underweighting sectors with diminishing future
performance.

4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I discuss the investment value of analysts’ recommendations and
how asset allocation strategies can affect the profitability of the recommendations. In
terms of both abnormal return and Sharpe Ratio, the passive asset allocation strategy,
which is commonly adopted in the literature, underperforms the active asset allocation
strategy. The active portfolio strategy has the highest abnormal return (about 4% weekly
abnormal return) then followed by the passive portfolio strategy (about 0.07%-0.08%
weekly abnormal return) and enhanced portfolio strategy (0.03% weekly abnormal
return). The Black-Litterman portfolio has the highest Sharpe ratio (around 0.2), while
both the passive portfolio and the enhanced portfolio only have a Sharpe Ratio close to
0.08.
The quality of analysts’ recommendations is critical to the success of the trading
strategy as well. Recommendations without target prices create noisy trading signals that
reduce the portfolio performance. Through the portfolio performance attribution analysis,
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I reveal that analysts’ recommendations in the manufacturing industry produce the
highest active return. The marginal value of switching from a passive strategy to an
active strategy comes from the improved active return in the asset allocation effect and
the interaction effect.
In this study, I provide findings that are valuable to both academics and
practitioners. I demonstrate that an active portfolio construction approach can be more
suitable for the goal of achieving higher performance and this strategy is more sensitive
to the quality of analysts’ recommendations than a passive strategy. I also provide insight
into applying the Black-Litterman model to study analysts’ recommendations. The
superior performance of the Black-Litterman model is largely explained by the enhanced
active return due to the improvement of the asset allocation effect and the interaction
effect.
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CHAPTER 5 : ANALYSTS’ HERDING NETWORK
In this chapter, I use a network analysis to examine analysts’ herding behavior. I
derive an analysts’ herding network from analysts’ targeted leader-follower behavior in
the presence of clustering stock recommendations. I find that the herding network
structure and analysts’ network centrality explain the performance of their non-herding
stock recommendations. I propose a learning by herding hypothesis to examine the
positive externality of analysts’ herding. Based on my results, I find that analysts who
play a central role in a network that facilitates the learning process can generate more
effective non-herding stock recommendations. This finding supports the learning by
herding hypothesis.
My study makes contributions in two major aspects. First, my findings add to the
understanding of analysts’ herding behavior. I demonstrate that there is a positive
externality of herding which is a different conclusion from many other herding studies.
Previous studies generally focus on the negative externality of analysts’ herding, where
herding results in a loss of information accuracy (Durand et al., 2014; Graham, 1999;
Welch, 2000). My study shows that herding can also create benefits, if herding results in
a knowledge absorption and performance enhancement. Second, I utilize a directed
network analysis to identify analysts’ herding behavior, which is a pioneering approach
to study herding. The directed network analysis highlights the direction of information
flow in the process of learning by herding and captures analysts’ dual role as a leader and
a follower at the same time. I demonstrate that the features of the analysts’ herding
network can explain the performance of their stock recommendations.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 provides a
literature review on herding issues and the application of network analysis in the analyst
literature. Section 5.2 details the methods for constructing the herding network. Section
5.3 discusses the data sample and presents the summary of the herding network
measurements. Section 5.4 examines the relationship between analysts’ performance and
the network structure and tests the learning by herding hypothesis. Section 5.4 concludes
the chapter.

5.1 Literature Review
5.1.1 Analysts’ Herding Literature
When analysts are producing their stock recommendations and earnings forecasts,
they are inevitably influenced by the opinions from their peers. Herding happens when
analysts suppress their own beliefs and base their stock recommendations or earnings
forecasts on peers’ output. Existing literature has documented ample evidence to show
that analysts have a tendency to herd (Bernhardt, Campello, & Kutsoati, 2006; Booth et
al., 2014; Durand et al., 2014; Hong et al., 2000; Jegadeesh & Kim, 2010).
Previous research provides a diversified definition of herding. In studying
analysts’ earnings forecasts, herding behavior can be identified as the reluctance to issue
bold earnings forecasts (Hong et al., 2000) resulting in the individual earnings forecasts
being aligned around the consensus (Bernhardt et al., 2006; Hong et al., 2000; Mensah &
Yang, 2008). In studying analysts’ stock recommendations, the evidence of herding is
found in analysts’ likelihood to issue recommendation ratings that are not far away from
the consensus rating and revise the rating based on the change of consensus rating
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(Jegadeesh & Kim, 2010). In studying the timeliness of the recommendations and
earnings forecasts, moving with the crowd rather than moving ahead of the crowd is
defined as a form of herding (Cooper, Day, & Lewis, 2001). In tracking the path of the
consensus recommendation ratings, path-leading recommendations are used to identify
the leaders and followers in the herding behavior (Booth et al., 2014; Welch, 2000).
Herding evidence can also be found through stock selections (W.-Y. Lin, Chen, & Chen,
2011), where analysts have a tendency to issue recommendations on stocks with some
common firm characteristics that are associated with future return.
Exploring the root cause of herding is a central topic in theoretical research.
Some researchers proposed that herding is influenced by reputation-based factors (Hong
et al., 2000; Stickel, 1992). Herding models that incorporated concern for reputation
(Graham, 1999; Scharfstein & Stein, 1990; Trueman, 1994) provided an explanation on
why herding behavior can vary systematically across analysts based on their experience.
For example, career concern (Hong et al., 2000) was identified as one major reason for
inexperienced analysts to herd and established analysts not to herd. This reputation-based
herding pattern is also found among other financial professionals, e.g., young and
inexperienced fund managers tended to exhibit extreme herding behavior when compared
to senior fund managers (Greenwood & Nagel, 2009). Economists treated the incentive to
herd as a completely rational choice when constructing the herding models. Their
rationale is that followers optimize the utility related to their long-term effects and
benefits. This completely rational choice model does not fully capture the nature of
herding. Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh (2003) proposed that herding can be either fully
rational or imperfectly rational, in which the imperfect rational model takes a socio-
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economic perspective to account for the fact that there is a lot of convergent behavior in
the financial market that cannot be explained by the rational economic models. For
example, Ashiya and Doi (2001) demonstrated that Japanese analysts were more
homogeneous than US analysts in terms of herding, thus there was little variation across
analysts’ experience. This finding contradicted the reputation-based hypothesis by Hong
et al. (2000) and highlighted the fact that herding incentive also relies on the cultural and
social environment in which analysts are embedded. Social psychology research found
that both psychological traits and social pressures were important in affecting an
individual’s decision-making process and can lead to convergent actions (G. S. Becker &
Murphy, 2009). In addition, researchers in sociology found that herding was also
entangled with social learning (Chamley, 2004; Ellison & Fudenberg, 1995; Vives,
1996). In the context of financial analysts’ herding, analysts can learn from top analysts
through herding, which results in a knowledge acquisition through the herding process.
Given the difference in herding incentives, it is unclear whether analysts’ herding
behavior results in a purely “bad” consequence for the financial markets. Most existing
studies viewed herding from the reputation-based perspective and treat herding as
detrimental to market efficiency (Arya, Glover, Mittendorf, & Narayanamoorthy, 2005;
Bernhardt et al., 2006; Durand et al., 2014; Welch, 2000). Researchers also found that
market participants could discern the reputation-based herding and discounted the
followers’ herding bias. Jegadeesh and Kim (2010) found that investors anticipated the
herding tendency and the market responded more strongly to analysts’ away-fromconsensus recommendations than to the toward-consensus recommendations. Similarly,
Booth et al. (2014) found that the market reaction to the recommendations from leader
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analysts was greater than that from the followers. Clement and Tse (2005) found that
analysts who issued more bold recommendations also had better accuracy in their
earnings forecasts, and Loh and Stulz (2011) found that lead analysts who issued more
timely recommendations were more likely to generate influential market reactions as
well.
In this study, I propose a learning by herding hypothesis, in which follower
analysts mimic leader analysts with the goal of learning from the leaders. Based on this
learning by herding hypothesis, follower analysts’ herding behaviors can be beneficial as
they can acquire knowledge and skills. I treat this benefit as a “positive herding
externality”, in that the knowledge acquired during the herding activity will eventually be
translated into better performance for the follower analysts as evidenced by the issuance
of more effective recommendations. This learning by herding hypothesis is grounded on
a social context, so understanding how effective learning is achieved by the follower
analysts also needs to be scrutinized through the features of the social environment, i.e.
the structure of the analysts’ herding network and analysts’ roles in the herding network.

5.1.2 Network Analysis in Finance
Existing literature has already demonstrated that social network analysis is a
powerful tool to investigate financial analysts’ performance. For example, the social
network constructed from common educational backgrounds can explain how the
performance of analysts’ stock recommendations is affected by the information
advantage from their school classmates (Cohen, Frazzini, & Malloy, 2010). The network
constructed from the overlapped stock coverage inside a brokerage house is capable of
explaining financial analysts’ forecast outcomes (Phua, Tham, & Wei, 2017). The
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network constructed from nonprofessional analysts’ opinions on social media platforms
can predict stock returns and earnings surprises (H. Chen, De, Hu, & Hwang, 2014).
However, the application of network analysis to address analysts’ herding is rare
in the existing literature. In this study, I fill a research gap by linking analysts’ herding
with a social learning motivation and utilize network analysis to assess this learning by
herding hypothesis. My study builds a herding network that is based on the targeted
leader-follower herding behavior in which herding takes place when there are multiple
analysts issuing a cluster of recommendations on the same stock within a short-time
period. The details of the herding network construction are provided in the next section.

5.2 Methodology
5.2.1 Definition of Connections in the Herding Network
In this study, I assume that leader analysts issue recommendations ahead of others
and followers issue recommendations after leaders. During the time gap, followers
observe what leaders have said about the underlying stock and decide which leader to
follow. I define herding as the late issuers sending out a recommendation that repeats the
same information as those issued by earlier issuers. Based on the context of
recommendation ratings, a leader-follower link is created between two analysts if the
follower’s recommendation rating is the same as the leader’s recommendation rating.
Previous research on analysts’ recommendations generally defines herding as the
tendency to make a recommendation rating close to the consensus rating. This definition
has two short-comings. First, herding toward consensus does not explicitly identify the
targeted leaders. Analysts have their own professional community and they know who
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their opinion leaders are. When deciding who to follow, analysts may only care about
opinions from some specific leaders. Therefore, herding toward consensus rating, which
includes all the outstanding ratings regardless of the issuers’ social status, may not truly
capture the mechanism of herding. Second, there may be inaccuracies associated with the
consensus calculation. Some analysts may discontinue the coverage of a stock and not
update their recommendation rating. As a result, the consensus rating includes too much
obsolete information, the aggregated rating would not represent the true opinions of the
crowd. The herding network constructed in this study addresses these two flaws and
identifies the role of leader and follower among paired analysts. In the herding network,
each individual analyst is represented by a node in the network graph. The edge
connecting any two nodes in the network presents the targeted leader-follower herding
behavior.
To gain a detailed understanding about how the leader-follower herding is
identified, it is necessary to briefly introduce how I determine the investment decision
from analysts’ recommendations. As in Chapter 2 through Chapter 4, I collect analysts’
recommendations from the I/B/E/S database. The data contains the analysts’ identifier,
the analysts’ coverage, the date of the recommendations and the recommendation ratings.
To simplify the analysis, I translate the five-level scale measurement in the I/B/E/S
database into a three-level scale, where “Strong Buy/Buy” becomes “BUY”, “Sell/Strong
Sell” becomes “SELL” and “Hold” remains as “HOLD”. It is necessary to make such a
translation for two reasons. First, some brokerage firms only have a three-level scale (13-5) while some other brokerage firms may have more than a five-level scale in their
original recommendation rating system. The I/B/E/S database aligns all those ratings into
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the five-level scale. If a brokerage firm using an original three-level scale issues a rating
of “Buy” (recorded as 1 according to I/B/E/S), it could be equivalent to either a “Strong
Buy” (rating of 1) or a “Buy” (rating of 2) in a five-level scale. Therefore, aligning at
five-level scale may neglect a portion of targeted leader-follower matches. Second,
follower analysts may make a minor change when adopting the leader’s opinion, however
those minor changes do not affect the implied investment decision in terms of
“Buy/Hold/Sell”, e.g. “Buy” and “Strong Buy” both suggest investors should buy the
underlying stock. Grouping recommendations into a three-level scale allows us to more
accurately capture all the possible leader-follower herding links. The historical
recommendations issued by different analysts on the same stock are checked to determine
whether any pair of two analysts exhibits the targeted leader-follower connections. For
example, if analyst X issues one recommendation on stock S and analyst Y issues the
same recommendation rating on stock S within a relatively short time period (in this
study, I use a 24-hour time gap), then the two recommendations suggest a directed
herding link from Y to X.
Table 5.1 presents an example to illustrate how herding connections can be
extracted from the record of a clustering of recommendations on the same stock. Panel A
presents the sample recommendation history and Panel B shows the corresponding
herding connections. There are seven recommendations issued by six analysts on the
same stock across two consecutive days. Analyst A issues the first “BUY”
recommendation, then B issues another “BUY” and then C issues another “BUY” on the
same day. D issues a different opinion “SELL” at the end of the day. On the next day,
analyst E still issues a “BUY” recommendation. Shortly after, analyst F issues a “SELL”

101

recommendation, which follows D’s opinion. In the last record, analyst A revises his
rating to “SELL” and then there are no further recommendations. Targeted leaderfollower connections are identified based on the sequential order and the context of each
recommendation. When B issues the 2nd “BUY” recommendation, he is assumed to herd
toward A’s preceding “BUY”. When C issues the 3rd recommendation, he is assumed to
herd the “BUY” recommendation from both A and B. When D issues the 4th
recommendation, which is the first different opinion, his recommendation does not
indicate any herding behavior. In the next day, E’s “BUY” recommendation is assumed
to only herd toward C’s “BUY”, because it is issued within 24 hours after C’s
recommendation and is not considered a follower of A and B. The “SELL”
recommendation by F is issued within 24 hours after D’s “SELL”, therefore this
recommendation is a herding from F to D. Lastly, A’s revision to “SELL” should also be
viewed as a herding to both D and F. From this example, herding is a dynamic process. A
is the first to start a recommendation and A influences several analysts to issue the same
recommendation. However, once a different opinion appears and is followed by some
other analysts (like analyst F), analyst A may now reconsider the new opinion and choose
to herd as well. Therefore, there is no unique role as a “leader” or a “follower” in the
herding network. Analyst A acts as both a “leader” and “follower” in this small example.
This feature more closely resembles the true learning and information updating process.
It is also likely that analysts may have actual social connections as well (e.g. one analyst
may follow another analyst on Twitter). However, the connections based on the actual
herding behavior in this study are considered a more reliable indicator of information
exchange as it goes beyond the symbolic connections such as labeling a “like” on
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Twitter. Analysts may have certain “real” social connections with other analysts, but they
may not necessarily care what others say unless there is substantial information
transferred through the connections. Therefore, the directed herding network provides a
distinct advantage for us to understand the mechanism of social learning and information
flow among analysts.
Table 5.1 Example of Extracting Herding Connections
Recommendation Order

Panel A: Recommendation Record
Date & Time

Recommendations

1st

2012 Feb 3, 10:00AM

Analyst A issued "Buy"

nd

2012 Feb 3, 11:30AM

Analyst B issued "Buy"

rd

2012 Feb 3, 1:15PM

Analyst C issued "Buy"

4

th

2012 Feb 3, 2:30PM

Analyst D issued "Sell"

5

th

2012 Feb 4, 10:30AM

Analyst E issued "Buy"

6th

2012 Feb 4, 11:45AM

Analyst F issued "Sell"

7th

2012 Feb 4, 1:30PM

Analyst A issued "Sell"

2

3

Panel B: Herding Connection (Edge in the Herding Network)
From
To
B
C
C
E
E
F
A
A

A
A
B
B
C
D
D
F

Figure 5.1 illustrates the graphical representation of the herding network example.
The directed line between a pair of nodes denotes a herding action from follower analyst
to leader analyst. Nodes that are larger indicate a larger number of connections, which
gives us an intuitive understanding about the analysts’ role in the network. The numeric
measurement of this network is discussed in detail in the next section.
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Figure 5.1 Graphical Representation of the Simple Herding Network Example

Notes: Each node denotes an analyst, the size of the node represents degree centrality of the connection

5.2.2 Definition of An Analyst’s Role in the Herding Network
There are numerous ways to denote the information exchange and learning flow
in a network. Since the herding network is a directed network in which the arrow of the
edge contains the information of the direction of herding, Degree Centrality (Freeman,
1978), is suitable for capturing the knowledge flow in a network. Degree Centrality
counts the number of links that are directly connected to neighboring nodes. In the case
of a directed network, Degree Centrality can be classified as indegree, outdegree and
total degree for each node. Indegree Centrality counts the number of links that are
directed toward the node, indicating how many times this analyst leads the herd.
Outdegree Centrality is the number of links that are directed to other nodes, indicating
how often this analyst herds other analysts’ recommendations. Total Degree Centrality is
the sum of Indegree Centrality and Outdegree Centrality and it measures the level of
engagement with other analysts inside the herding network. There are other types of
centrality measures such as betweenness centrality, closeness centrality and eigenvector
centrality (Freeman, 1978), however for a directed network structure as discussed in this
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study, Degree Centrality is most suitable to capture the nature of learning by herding and
to identify the individual analyst’s role as a leader, a follower or both.

5.2.3 Definition of Herding Communities and the Network Structure
As discussed in the previous section, in a targeted leader-follower herding, the
follower may agree with only a certain range of leaders, but not necessarily everyone in
the network. As a result, a denser herding behavior may occur among a sub-group of
analysts, where analysts inside the group are more connected with each other and less
connected to analysts outside the group. The difference in the level of connections within
the sub-group and outside the sub-group influences how analysts interact with other
analysts, convey information and share knowledge. Therefore, it is necessary to identify
those sub-groups or communities that exhibit a denser set of connections when exploring
the herding network structure. In this study, I define a herding community as a dense
subgraph in the herding network and use the herding communities to better understand
the structural influence of the network on analysts’ herding behavior. To identify the
herding communities, an hierarchical approach, called the fast and greedy algorithm
(Newman, 2004), is adopted to perform a clustering analysis on the nodes of analysts in
the herding network. The idea of this community detection approach is that the algorithm
tries to group members to form communities that optimize a quality function called
modularity (Newman, 2006). Networks with high modularity have denser connections
between the nodes within the communities. The algorithm starts with an assumption that
all the nodes in the network are coming from separate communities. Then communities
are merged iteratively according to the increase in the modularity. The merge process
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stops when there is no possibility to increase the modularity score further and the final
groups of members represent the detected communities
Once the herding communities are created, I consider the following three network
properties to represent the structure of the herding communities: Size, Density and
Reciprocity. Size refers to how many analysts are included in a detected community. A
large Size indicates more opportunities to hear opinions from different people, which
could increase the breadth of learning. Density represents the strength of connections
among analysts within the community. Density is calculated as the number of edges
(targeted leader-follower links) in a community divided by the total possible edges for
that community. If community members are all connected to each other, then Density
becomes 1, otherwise it is less than 1. A large Density indicates a greater level of
information flows across the community, which may facilitate the process of social
learning. Reciprocity measures the likelihood of nodes in a directed network to be
mutually linked (Garlaschelli & Loffredo, 2004). In the herding network, if analyst X
herds toward analyst Y in one recommendation while analyst Y herds toward analyst X in
another recommendation, then X and Y are assumed to have reciprocal ties and are
mutually linked. Such analysts may have reciprocal interests that motivate them to herd
to each other. Reciprocity is calculated as the number of mutual links divided by the
number of total edges in the network. Reciprocity being 1 indicates a purely bi-directional
network and a value of 0 represents a purely unidirectional network. A high Reciprocity
indicates a high likelihood that information exchange is bi-directional, while a low
Reciprocity indicates a high likelihood that information exchange is unidirectional.
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5.3 Data and Herding Network Description
In this study, I choose my data sample from I/B/E/S database and my examination
period covers from the year of 2005 to the year of 2015 to avoid the regulatory impact
from the Regulation Fair Disclosure (Arya et al., 2005; Mensah & Yang, 2008), NYSE
Rule 2711 and NASD Rule 472 on analysts’ behavior (B. M. Barber et al., 2006; Chan et
al., 2014; C.-Y. Chen & Chen, 2013; DONG & HU, 2016). To reduce the unnecessary
nodes in the herding network, I only consider analysts who are actively issuing
recommendations during my examination period. Consequently, only analysts who have
issued at least 100 recommendations between 2005 and 2015 are included.
After screening the data, my data sample consists of 185,106 recommendations
issued by 868 individual analysts and covers 8,539 stocks. Among those 185,106
recommendations, only 9,243 (4.99%) recommendations are identified herding
recommendations and the remaining 95.01% are non-herding recommendations. Based
on these 9,243 herding recommendations, 8,247 targeted leader-follower herding links
are extracted. To capture the dynamics of herding behavior and the evolution of the
network structure, the herding community detection and centrality calculation is
performed on a yearly basis. A two-year rolling window is applied to identify the targeted
leader-follower links, then the herding community detection is performed based on the
extracted links. Using the two-year window guarantees that there will be a sufficient
number of links to create the network without too many obsolete records. In addition, for
the variable Density to be meaningful, I exclude herding communities that are formed by
less than 3 analysts, as those communities will have a large density that does not
necessarily reflect a truly strong connection among the few analysts.
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Table 5.2 presents the summary of the number of edges (targeted leader-follower
links) and the number of nodes (analysts) used to construct the herding networks on a
yearly basis. Table 5.3 provides summaries of the network structure based on the herding
communities detected by the fast and greedy algorithm. Starting from the year 2007, the
number of detected communities stabilizes near sixteen. The average of the community
density, community reciprocity and community size also remain relatively stable. Given
the occurrence of the global financial crisis during the year 2007, it appears that the
network structure pattern may have changed after 2007. This change may suggest a shift
of the herding behavior in the post-crisis period. This finding is consistent with some
research results documented by Bekiros, Jlassi, Lucey, Naoui, and Uddin (2017) and
Mensah and Yang (2008).

Table 5.2 Sample Data Used to Construct the Herding Network on A Yearly Basis
Year
# of Nodes
# of Edges
2005
556
1227
2006
623
1454
2007
705
1903
2008
746
2200
2009
785
2376
2010
799
2285
2011
793
2410
2012
768
2591
2013
758
2674
2014
705
2551
2015
651
2207
Notes: For each year, recommendations from a two-year period (current year and previous year) are used to
identify the herding behavior and extract the targeted leader-follower herding. This two-year period
contains sufficient number of edges to create the network and captures analysts’ most recent herding
activities.
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Table 5.3 Identified Herding Communities on A Yearly Basis
Year
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

# Detected
Communities
20
21
17
14
14
15
15
16
16
16
16

Community Density
Max
Mean
Min
0.333
0.076
0.019
0.333
0.067
0.019
0.167
0.046
0.019
0.077
0.035
0.015
0.150
0.036
0.017
0.333
0.051
0.013
0.068
0.035
0.017
0.333
0.058
0.016
0.095
0.045
0.018
0.333
0.070
0.018
0.167
0.061
0.018

Community Reciprocity
Max
Mean
Min
0.323
0.149
0.000
0.389
0.143
0.000
0.364
0.152
0.000
0.268
0.154
0.100
0.278
0.143
0.086
0.191
0.122
0.000
0.222
0.132
0.057
0.217
0.135
0.000
0.208
0.129
0.071
0.238
0.130
0.000
0.195
0.138
0.000

Max
153
152
175
237
222
238
194
224
225
227
187

Community Size
Mean
61.100
66.143
91.765
120.357
126.214
122.333
123.467
114.063
110.125
102.313
92.750

Min
3
4
7
28
16
3
35
3
23
3
7

Notes: Herding Communities that contain less than four analysts are excluded in the summary as the density can be overestimated for
communities with small size.
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Figure 5.2 Scatter plot of Herding Community Measurements

Notes: The scatterplots are constructed based on the 10-year examination period at the community-year
level.

Figure 5.2 illustrates the relationship between the community size, community
density and community reciprocity. As illustrated by the scatter plots, there is an obvious
negative nonlinear relationship between the community size and density. This negative
relationship indicates that analysts are less likely to be fully connected to everyone in a
large herding community than they are in a small community. One reason may be that in
a large community, analysts can have a more diversified coverage and there is little
information exchange among analysts who do not have common industrial coverage. The
relationship between community density and community reciprocity does not exhibit an
obvious pattern, nor does community reciprocity seem to be correlated with the size of
the community.
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Figure 5.3 Histogram of The Herding Network Features

Notes: The histograms are constructed based on the 10-year examination period at the community-year
level.

Figure 5.4 Analyst Herding Network by Year

Note: Each graph represents a network structure for the corresponding year, the color of the nodes
represents the herding community, the size of the nodes represents the degree centrality.
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Figure 5.3 contains the histograms for each network feature based on the detected
herding communities. Both Density and Reciprocity exhibit strong positive skewness,
which would indicate that most herding communities are not densely connected. This
may be partially caused by the choice of the two-year rolling window so that some old
links are excluded in the network analysis. Figure 5.4 presents the identified herding
network for each year in the sample.

5.4 Hypotheses and Empirical Analysis
5.4.1 Learning by Herding Hypothesis
The goal of this study is to examine whether analysts’ herding behavior leads to
knowledge acquisition. In this chapter, my definition of herding is based on the detection
of who the follower analysts choose to herd, which is different from some other
definitions used in existing literature. Based on the definition of herding as issuing
recommendation ratings close to the consensus, Jegadeesh and Kim (2010) find that the
market reaction to away-from-the-consensus recommendations is higher than the herding
recommendations. Based on the definition of herding as following path-directing
recommendations, Booth et al. (2014) find the status of lead analysts is persistent and
lead analysts generate stronger market reaction. Based on the identification of lead
analysts by the timeliness of the earnings forecasts, Cooper et al. (2001) find that lead
analysts have a greater impact on stock prices than the follower analysts.
My herding definition allows the network analysis to capture the information
diffusion across the network. Within the herding community in the network, if the
follower analysts’ herding incentive is to learn from leader analysts, there will be a
positive network externality related to analysts’ knowledge acquisition in the process of
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learning by herding. The learning effectiveness can be assessed from how well the
network structure facilitates the information flow and knowledge transfer. Therefore, I
propose the following two hypotheses based on the assumption of learning by herding.
x

H1: There is a positive relationship between analysts’ centralities and the
performance of analysts’ non-herding recommendations.

x

H2: There is a positive relationship between the level of information flow in the
herding network and the performance of analysts’ non-herding
recommendations.

The second hypothesis can be broken down into three specific hypotheses that
account for the measurement of analysts’ herding network. First, the learning acquisition
process can be improved if analysts obtain information from a wider range of people.
This suggests
x

H2a: There is a positive relationship between the herding community size and the
performance of analysts’ non-herding recommendations.

Second, analysts can also enjoy a more efficient learning process if the density of the
knowledge transmission is high, suggesting
x

H2b: There is a positive relationship between the herding community density
and the performance of analysts’ non-herding recommendations.

The last hypothesis related to the structure of herding network is about Reciprocity.
Although the word “Reciprocity” implies a benefit shared between partners, the mutual
herding behavior may actually impede the learning process. If learning is the motivation
to herd, then mutual herding narrows the scope of information diffusion and makes the
information between the two mutual herding partners become stagnant. In addition,
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mutual herding may indicate a high likelihood that herding is not based on the purpose of
learning, but rather based on other motivations, such as reputation concern or just blind
trust which creates a negative herding externality. Therefore, the following hypothesis is
proposed regarding the impact of Reciprocity:
x

H2c: There is a negative relationship between the herding community
reciprocity and the performance of analysts’ non-herding recommendations.

Finally, both learning and herding are social behaviors, which involve the interaction
between individual analysts embedded in the network and the structure of the network.
The success of knowledge transfer and absorption also depends on the interaction
between the analysts’ network role and the network structure. Therefore, I propose a third
hypothesis as follows:
x

H3: The interactions between analysts’ centrality and the size, density and
reciprocity of the herding communities have a significant impact on the
performance of analysts’ non-herding recommendations.

5.4.2 Empirical Analysis
To test my learning by herding hypothesis, I use a general linear regression model
to examine the relationship between the performance of analysts’ non-herding
recommendations with the network structure and analysts’ centrality.
As in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I use the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) to
measure the performance of analysts’ recommendations. In the calculation of BHAR, a [1, +1] trading-day window around the recommendation announcement is adopted with a
bench market portfolio constructed from a four-factor model (Carhart, 1997) to calculate
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the BHAR. The procedure of the calculation is the same as specified in Equation 2.3 and
Equation 2.5.
I use four primary variables to capture the herding network structure and the
analysts’ role within the network: Size, Density, Reciprocity and Centrality. Size, Density
and Reciprocity represent the herding communities network structure. Centrality is the
studentized residual of the Total Degree Centrality, which is calculated each year for
each node by calculating the node’s Total Degree Centrality and subtracting the
community average Total Degree Centrality associated with the node and then dividing
the result by the standard deviation of Total Degree Centrality within the community
associated with the node. Centrality measures how actively analysts are engaged in
herding within the community and is treated as a standardized measurement for analysts’
social role in the network. In addition to these four primary variables, the regression
model also includes the interaction terms between the network community structure and
analysts’ social role to explore their joint impact on analysts’ performance.
I begin with the following regression model to investigate whether analysts’
performance on the non-herding recommendations can be related to analysts’ herding:
¼,, = 3 + '5 {v"/S¯"¼, + '6 7¯_{¼, + '9 }{vB¯"¼, + '> {|¯z/R|¯"¼, +
"¯vw }~¼,, + {/ ~ + ¼,, (5.1)
where ¼,, is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for a non-herding recommendation
issued by analyst i on stock k at date t; {v"/S¯"¼, is the Centrality for analyst i at date
t; 7¯_{¼, , }{vB¯"¼, and {|¯z/R|¯"¼, are the Size, Density and Reciprocity for the
herding community that analyst i belongs to at date t; Rating Dummy is the dummy
variable for the three-level scale rating; year dummy captures the time fixed effects.
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Similar to the analysis in Chapter 3, I also include control variables that account
for analyst characteristics, stock characteristics, market characteristics and individual
recommendation characteristics in an expanded full model as specified in the following
equation:
¼,, = 3 + '5 {v"/S¯"¼, + '6 7¯_{¼, + '9 }{vB¯"¼, + '> {|¯z/R|¯"¼, +
'Ê {v"/S¯"¼, ∗ 7¯_{¼, + 'r {v"/S¯"¼, ∗ }{vB¯"¼, + 'q {v"/S¯"¼, ∗
{|¯z/R|¯"¼, + 'Ë {®z¼, + 'Ì Í/R!{/ B¯_{¼, + '5d "B!B¼, + '55 Î¯/ Í{", +
'56 |z¯"S B¯_{, + '59 C + '5> "¯vw }¯ÎÎ¼,, + '5Ê {| ¯{ }~¼,, +
"¯vw }~¼,, + {/ ~ +

¼,,

(5.2)

where {®z¼, is the individual analyst’s years of working experience at date t,
Í/R!{/ B¯_{¼, is the number of analysts hired by the brokerage firm during date t,
"B!B¼, is the number of different stocks covered by the individual analysts i on date t,
Î¯/ Í{", and |z¯"S B¯_{, denote the stock beta from the CAPM model and
market capitalization value for the underlying stock k on date t, C is the value of VIX
index on date t when the recommendation is issued, which proxies for the market
uncertainty, "¯vw }¯ÎÎ¼,, is the difference between the recommendation rating issued
by the individual analyst i and the consensus rating, {| ¯{ }~¼,, is a dummy
variable representing whether the recommendation is issued during the time when the
stock market is operating or after the stock market is closed.
Table 5.4 presents the results of regressions that examine the learning by herding
hypothesis. Model (1) is the base model that is defined by Equation (5.1). Model (2) is
the base model plus the interaction terms, which is used in conjunction with other models
to examine H3. Model (6) is the full model as specified by Equation (5.2). Model (3)
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includes the control variables representing analysts’ characteristics (exp, broker size and
tasks). Model (4) adds stock characteristics (firm size and firm beta). Model (5) further
adds the VIX index to account for the market uncertainty and economic situations. As the
results show, the coefficients of the key explanatory variables ( '5 − 'q ) are consistent
across the six model specifications, which implies that the findings are robust against
different model specifications.
Based on the results from Model (2) and Model (6), Hypothesis 3 is supported by
the statistical significance of the coefficients for all three of the interaction terms.
Hypothesis 2a, Hypothesis 2b and Hypothesis 2c are supported by the result of Model (6)
under certain conditions. The actual effect of the Size, Reciprocity and Density on BHAR
is equivalent to (0.001*Centrality+0.003), -(2.432*Centrality+1.910) and
(3.827+5.492*Centrality), respectively. These results suggest that if an analyst has an
above-average Centrality in his herding community, then the learning by herding
hypotheses specified in Hypothesis 2a -Hypothesis 2c is supported since Size, Density
and Reciprocity are positive. This finding implies that the learning by herding hypothesis
is applicable to the analysts who exhibit at least a certain level of engagement in their
community. Based on the methods employed in this study, it is difficult to determine
whether the herding results in a positive or negative externality for analysts with a below
average Centrality in their herding communities. As the result, the learning by herding
hypothesis does not apply to analysts with extremely low Centrality in their communities.
In the examination of the relationship between Centrality and the learning
outcome, Model (6) indicates that the main effect has a negative and yet insignificant
impact on analysts’ non-herding recommendations. However, since the interactions
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between Centrality and all the three herding community features are significant, the
actual effect for Centrality is (5.492*Density+0.001*Size-2.432*Reciprocity-0.058).
Given a herding community that has a large Density, large Size and small Reciprocity,
this Centrality effect is positive, which indicates that analysts can achieve better
performance for the non-herding recommendations if they increase their level of herding
behavior in the herding network. However, if a herding community is featured by a low
Density, small Size and large Reciprocity, this Centrality effect could be negative, which
would suggest that increasing the level of herding behavior in this type of community
does not lead to a positive learning outcome. Therefore, whether Hypothesis 1 is
supported depends on the structure of the herding network. If analysts’ herding network
can support the process of learning and information flow (i.e. large Density, large Size
and small Reciprocity), then increasing the herding activity (i.e. increasing Centrality)
increases the learning outcome; otherwise, herding is harmful and does not improve
analysts’ ability to generate effective non-herding recommendations.
Table 5.4 The Herding Network Structure on the Non-Herding Recommendation
Effectiveness
Dependent Variable:
BHAR [-1, +1] (%)
Centrality
Density
Reciprocity
Size

Model (1)
b/(se)
-0.050
(0.031)
4.201*
(2.295)
-2.126***
(0.691)
0.003***
(0.001)

Centrality*Density

NA

Centrality*Reciprocity

NA

Centrality*Size

NA

Rating = 1

-5.354
(0.106)

Model (2)
b/(se)
-0.065
(0.184)
4.204*
(2.295)
-2.129***
(0.691)
0.003***
(0.001)
5.949***
(2.251)
-2.632
(0.661)
0.002**
(0.001)
-5.367
(0.106)

Model (3)
b/(se)
-0.056
(0.185)
3.721
(2.311)
-1.829**
(0.715)
0.003***
(0.001)
5.397**
(2.269)
-2.382***
(0.675)
0.001*
(0.001)
-5.388
(0.106)
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Model (4)
b/(se)
-0.059
(0.185)
3.728
(2.311)
-1.775**
(0.715)
0.003***
(0.001)
5.408**
(2.269)
-2.380***
(0.675)
0.001*
(0.001)
-5.389
(0.106)

Model (5)
b/(se)
-0.050
(0.184)
3.672
(2.31)
-1.733**
(0.715)
0.003***
(0.001)
5.326**
(2.268)
-2.378***
(0.674)
0.001*
(0.001)
-5.370
(0.106)

Model (6)
b/(se)
-0.058
(0.185)
3.827*
(2.316)
-1.910***
(0.719)
0.003***
(0.001)
5.492**
(2.276)
-2.432***
(0.678)
0.001**
(0.001)
-5.206
(0.123)

Analysts Characteristics

-1.882
(0.105)
0.0
(.)
No

-1.891
(0.105)
0.0
(.)
No

-1.905
(0.106)
0.0
(.)
Yes

-1.907
(0.106)
0.0
(.)
Yes

-1.888
(0.106)
0.0
(.)
Yes

-1.698
(0.129)
0.0
(.)
Yes

Stock Characteristics

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Market Uncertainty

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Timing/Boldness

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Rating = 2
Rating = 3

Notes: ***, **, * indicates a p-value for a two-tailed test <0.01, <0.05, <0.10 respectively.
The Analyst Characteristics include the variables of analysts’ years of working experience (exp), the
number of analysts hired by the brokerage firm (broker size) and the number of different stocks covered by
the analyst (tasks).
The Stock Characteristics include the stock beta (firm beta) and the stock market capitalization (firm size).
The Market Uncertainty is denoted by the VIX index (VIX).
The Recommendation Timing/Boldness includes a dummy variable that shows whether the
recommendation is issued during the time of exchange market operations or during after time (timing) and
a variable shows the difference between the stock recommendation rating and the consensus rating
(BOLD).

5.5 Conclusion
My study on the herding network structure and analyst’s centrality provides
evidence to show that analysts’ ability to generate effective non-herding
recommendations can be attributed to the interaction between the network structure
(herding network communities) and the individual analyst’s role in the network
(centrality). In my study, I track both the changes of herding community and the changes
of analysts’ roles in the communities on a yearly basis to capture the dynamics of the
herding. There are two situations that result in the positive herding externality as
suggested by the learning by herding hypothesis. First, the herding community needs to
support the information diffusion and knowledge transfer (large Size, large Density and
small Reciprocity). Second, analysts need to show above-average level of herding
engagement (above average Centrality). In a herding network that provides little support
for learning and information transferring, increasing the level of herding may be harmful
as learning might not be the true motivation for herding. These findings are robust against
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different model specifications and are consistent with the hypothesis of learning by
herding from a structural social learning perspective.
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CHAPTER 6 : CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this dissertation thesis, I provide four studies that are centered on the topic of
financial analysts’ recommendations. In the first study of analysts’ over-optimism, I
demonstrate that analysts’ over-optimistic bias can be reflected by a consistent market
reaction asymmetry across different recommendation categories. In the second study, I
decompose analysts’ over-optimism into two parts: the conscious distortion due to the
issue of conflicts-of-interest and the unconscious distortion due to the behavioral bias. By
comparing the mitigation of the market reaction asymmetry due to the adoption of
regulations with the mitigation due to the “Self-Correction” mechanism, I show that both
parts play an equally important role in affecting the market reaction asymmetry. My
study highlights the importance of recognizing the “Self-Correction” mechanism in the
evaluation of the policy effect that relates to the restoring of the financial market
functionality. In the third study, I focus on the investment value of analysts’
recommendation. I compare different recommendation-based trading strategies and use
the portfolio construction approach to perform the analysis. I find that investors can
achieve higher abnormal return when using an active portfolio management strategy
based on the Black-Litterman framework. This incremental abnormal return is primarily
attributed to the overweight/underweight of the asset allocation in
outperforming/underperforming sectors. The portfolio performance is also dependent on
the quality of analysts’ recommendations. Without the information of a target price
estimate, analysts’ recommendations produce noisy trading signals and decrease the
profitability of the trading strategy. In my fourth study on analysts’ herding, I perform a
network analysis to test my learning by herding hypothesis. I create analysts’ herding
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networks based on the targeted leader-follower herding connections and identify analysts’
role in the network as well as how well the network structure affects the information flow
and knowledge transfer. In this pioneering study, I demonstrate that the performance of
analysts’ non-herding recommendations can be explained by their herding network. If
analysts play an active role in engaging with other analysts in a network that has the
feature of promoting the learning process, then those analysts can issue more effective
non-herding recommendation, which is consistent with the learning by herding
hypothesis.
In my dissertation thesis, I make contributions to the analyst literature by
providing a different measure to gauge analysts’ over-optimism, a different tradingstrategy to evaluate analysts’ investment value, and a different perspective to view
analysts’ herding externality. My dissertation study opens a door to many research
possibilities for the future study. In the study of analysts’ over-optimism, I find that the
financial market quickly responds to analysts’ recommendations and the
recommendations have little influence over a longer time horizon. This finding
contradicts the studies that were performed with data from 20 years ago (Brav & Lehavy,
2003; Stickel, 1992; Womack, 1996). Exploring the dynamics of the recommendation
duration will be an interesting research topic that helps us understand the time value of
analysts’ recommendations as well as the changing environment that concerns the market
information efficiency. In the study of analysts’ investment value, I adopt the BlackLitterman model by assuming that the view uncertainty for the recommended stocks are
in equal proportion to the observed volatility. This assumption can be relaxed by my
findings of analysts’ over-optimism and herding externality, which show that analysts can
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affect the stock price differently. Incorporating the information of analysts’
characteristics into the portfolio design may lead to additional understanding of analysts’
investment value. In my study of analysts’ herding networks, I construct the network
based on the recommendation ratings and I use BHAR [-1, +1] to evaluate the analysts’
performance. In a future study that continues this research topic, I will explore how my
results will be affected by different definitions of herding, e.g. based on the
recommendation revisions and/or based on analysts’ earnings forecasts and target price,
as well as how my conclusion can be affected by different definitions of performance,
e.g. BHAR with different trading-day window, and/or duration of the recommendation
effectiveness. I will also consider research methods that can identify herding behaviors
that are truly driven by learning motivation rather than random connections. In addition, I
also have a plan to extend my study to cover analysts from countries other than US and
compare how cultural and social element and regulatory environments can affect
analysts’ over-optimism and herding behaviors differently.
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